1
00:00:48,198 --> 00:00:49,175
<i>"Laura,</i>

2
00:00:49,799 --> 00:00:53,185
<i>"At this stage, I can offer
nothing more than my word.</i>

3
00:00:53,203 --> 00:00:57,244
<i>"I am a senior government employee
in the intelligence community.</i>

4
00:00:57,323 --> 00:00:59,362
<i>"I hope you'll understand
that contacting you is</i>

5
00:00:59,424 --> 00:01:01,860
<i>"extremely high-risk,
and you are willing to agree</i>

6
00:01:01,878 --> 00:01:05,123
<i>"to the following precautions
before I share more.</i>

7
00:01:05,170 --> 00:01:08,366
<i>"This will not be
a waste of your time.</i>

8
00:01:08,384 --> 00:01:13,538
<i>"The following sounds complex, but should only
take minutes to complete for someone technical.</i>

9
00:01:13,556 --> 00:01:16,685
<i>"I would like to confirm out of
email that the keys we exchanged</i>

10
00:01:16,724 --> 00:01:20,929
<i>"were not intercepted and
replaced by your surveillance.</i>

11
00:01:20,980 --> 00:01:23,292
<i>"Please confirm that no one
has ever had a copy</i>

12
00:01:23,315 --> 00:01:26,485
<i>"of your private key and that it
uses a strong passphrase.</i>

13
00:01:26,519 --> 00:01:31,056
<i>"Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.</i>

14
00:01:31,199 --> 00:01:33,292
<i>"If the device you store
the private key</i>

15
00:01:33,324 --> 00:01:36,061
<i>"and enter your passphrase on
has been hacked,</i>

16
00:01:36,079 --> 00:01:39,531
<i>"it is trivial to decrypt
our communications.</i>

17
00:01:39,565 --> 00:01:42,186
<i>"Understand that the above steps
are not bullet-proof</i>

18
00:01:42,225 --> 00:01:44,736
<i>"and are intended only
to give us breathing room.</i>

19
00:01:44,754 --> 00:01:46,803
<i>"In the end, if you publish
the source material,</i>

20
00:01:46,858 --> 00:01:49,074
<i>"I will likely be
immediately implicated.</i>

21
00:01:49,092 --> 00:01:54,096
<i>"This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.</i>

22
00:01:54,130 --> 00:01:57,099
<i>"Thank you, and be careful.</i>

23
00:01:57,133 --> 00:01:59,685
<i>"CitizenFour"</i>

24
00:02:21,440 --> 00:02:24,713
<i>The bottom line is,
surveillance means</i>

25
00:02:24,783 --> 00:02:27,963
<i>that there are facts
that we no longer abide to.</i>

26
00:02:27,997 --> 00:02:29,614
<i>If you take away
the surveillance,</i>

27
00:02:29,632 --> 00:02:32,251
<i>there are no facts that
the government can manufacture.</i>

28
00:02:32,285 --> 00:02:35,420
<i>Ah, that's right, and this is all
about creating an independent record.</i>

29
00:02:35,454 --> 00:02:39,122
<i>To me, this goes to the question</i>

30
00:02:39,200 --> 00:02:42,958
<i>of independently verifying
what the government is doing.</i>

31
00:02:42,997 --> 00:02:46,565
<i>That's why I keep going back
to that question.</i>

32
00:02:46,599 --> 00:02:49,544
<i>More with
David Sirota after "CBS News,"</i>

33
00:02:49,598 --> 00:02:53,772
<i>traffic, and weather
on KKZN Denver/Boulder, AM 7...</i>

34
00:02:59,531 --> 00:03:01,799
Hey, can you hear me?

35
00:03:01,818 --> 00:03:04,453
I am here, David. How are you?

36
00:03:07,870 --> 00:03:10,171
Well, I would just point...
start by pointing to what

37
00:03:10,198 --> 00:03:12,500
Barack Obama himself said
about those questions

38
00:03:12,534 --> 00:03:15,480
when he was running for
the office that he now occupies.

39
00:03:15,512 --> 00:03:17,729
In December of 2007,
he said, quote,

40
00:03:17,761 --> 00:03:21,233
"The President does not have
the power under the Constitution

41
00:03:21,267 --> 00:03:24,019
"to unilaterally authorize
a military attack in a situation

42
00:03:24,070 --> 00:03:27,940
"that does not involve stopping an actual
or imminent threat to the nation."

43
00:03:27,974 --> 00:03:31,309
So, by Obama's own words, the
President does not have the power

44
00:03:31,327 --> 00:03:33,645
that he is now exercising
under the Constitution.

45
00:03:33,663 --> 00:03:37,482
And as far as why it matters,
in... on August 1st, 2007,

46
00:03:37,500 --> 00:03:41,153
when he laid out his reasons why
he was running for office

47
00:03:41,171 --> 00:03:43,372
and why he thought it was
so important to change the way

48
00:03:43,423 --> 00:03:45,323
we were doing things,
he said, quote,

49
00:03:45,341 --> 00:03:48,093
"No more ignoring the law
when it's inconvenient.

50
00:03:48,128 --> 00:03:49,762
"That is not who we are.

51
00:03:49,796 --> 00:03:51,930
"We will again set
an example for the world

52
00:03:51,965 --> 00:03:55,501
"that the law is not subject to
the whims of stubborn rulers."

53
00:03:55,535 --> 00:03:57,703
<i>So, to allow presidents
to simply start wars</i>

54
00:03:57,737 --> 00:03:59,838
<i>on their own, without any...</i>

55
00:04:23,913 --> 00:04:26,415
<i>"You asked why I picked you.</i>

56
00:04:26,449 --> 00:04:28,884
<i>"I didn't. You did.</i>

57
00:04:29,215 --> 00:04:32,418
<i>"The surveillance you've
experienced means you've been 'selected'.</i>

58
00:04:32,463 --> 00:04:34,089
<i>"A term
which will mean more to you</i>

59
00:04:34,107 --> 00:04:38,227
<i>"as you learn about how
the modern SIGINT system works.</i>

60
00:04:38,261 --> 00:04:41,430
<i>"For now, know that
every border you cross,</i>

61
00:04:41,481 --> 00:04:42,931
<i>"every purchase you make,</i>

62
00:04:42,982 --> 00:04:44,433
<i>"every call you dial,</i>

63
00:04:44,484 --> 00:04:46,429
<i>"every cell phone tower you pass,</i>

64
00:04:46,468 --> 00:04:47,519
<i>"friend you keep,</i>

65
00:04:47,554 --> 00:04:48,866
<i>"article you write,</i>

66
00:04:48,882 --> 00:04:50,055
<i>"site you visit,</i>

67
00:04:50,073 --> 00:04:51,523
<i>"subject line you type,</i>

68
00:04:51,557 --> 00:04:52,874
<i>"and packet you route</i>

69
00:04:52,913 --> 00:04:55,894
<i>"is in the hands of a system
whose reach is unlimited,</i>

70
00:04:55,912 --> 00:04:59,054
<i>"but whose safeguards are not.</i>

71
00:04:59,108 --> 00:05:01,066
<i>"Your victimization
by the NSA system</i>

72
00:05:01,084 --> 00:05:02,901
<i>"means that you are
well aware of the threat</i>

73
00:05:02,919 --> 00:05:06,905
<i>"that unrestricted secret police
pose for democracies.</i>

74
00:05:07,235 --> 00:05:10,087
<i>"This is a story
few but you can tell."</i>

75
00:06:04,097 --> 00:06:06,131
<i>Thank you
for inviting me here, uh,</i>

76
00:06:06,149 --> 00:06:09,968
<i>to give me the opportunity
to, uh, express my, uh, story,</i>

77
00:06:09,986 --> 00:06:11,855
<i>but let me give you some
of my background.</i>

78
00:06:11,878 --> 00:06:14,238
<i>Um, I spent about 4 years
in the military,</i>

79
00:06:14,261 --> 00:06:17,475
<i>then I went into NSA,
directly, so...</i>

80
00:06:17,493 --> 00:06:21,663
<i>so I ended up with about
37 years of service combined.</i>

81
00:06:21,698 --> 00:06:23,462
<i>Most of it was a lot
of fun, I tell you.</i>

82
00:06:23,486 --> 00:06:25,783
<i>It was really a lot of fun,
breaking these puzzles,</i>

83
00:06:25,785 --> 00:06:27,586
you know, solving problems
and things like that,

84
00:06:27,643 --> 00:06:29,393
so... and that's really
what I did.

85
00:06:29,432 --> 00:06:31,362
I fundamentally started
working out with data,

86
00:06:31,401 --> 00:06:33,979
looking at data and data systems
and how you do that.

87
00:06:34,009 --> 00:06:37,526
I was developing this concept
of, um, analysis

88
00:06:37,542 --> 00:06:39,681
that you could
lay it out in such a way

89
00:06:39,716 --> 00:06:42,003
that it could be coded
and executed electronically,

90
00:06:42,034 --> 00:06:44,803
meaning you could
automate analysis, okay?

91
00:06:44,837 --> 00:06:46,271
And it has to do with metadata

92
00:06:46,306 --> 00:06:48,390
and using
metadata relationships.

93
00:06:48,441 --> 00:06:51,393
So that was the whole... that was
my whole theme there at NSA.

94
00:06:51,444 --> 00:06:53,094
That was... eventually, that's
what I ended up to.

95
00:06:53,110 --> 00:06:55,814
I was the only one there
doing that, by the way.

96
00:06:56,051 --> 00:07:00,188
So, uh, any rate,
9/11 happened and, uh...

97
00:07:00,219 --> 00:07:03,155
it must have been, uh,
right after... a few days,

98
00:07:03,189 --> 00:07:05,523
no more than a week
after, uh, 9/11...

99
00:07:05,541 --> 00:07:07,960
that they, uh, decided to begin

100
00:07:07,994 --> 00:07:11,129
actively, uh, spying
on everyone in this country.

101
00:07:11,164 --> 00:07:14,383
And they wanted the back part
of our program

102
00:07:14,417 --> 00:07:17,302
to run all the spying,
all right?

103
00:07:17,337 --> 00:07:20,472
So... ahem... that's exactly
what they did.

104
00:07:20,506 --> 00:07:22,712
And then they started
taking the telecom data

105
00:07:22,766 --> 00:07:25,811
and then expanded
after that, so...

106
00:07:25,845 --> 00:07:27,846
I mean, the one I knew was AT&T,

107
00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:31,433
and that one provided
320 million records every day.

108
00:07:31,882 --> 00:07:34,905
That program was
re-authorized every 45 days

109
00:07:34,938 --> 00:07:37,316
by the... what I called
the "Yes Committee",

110
00:07:37,356 --> 00:07:41,826
which was Hayden
and Tenet and... the DOJ.

111
00:07:42,152 --> 00:07:44,477
The program was called
Stellar Wind.

112
00:07:44,504 --> 00:07:47,332
So first I went to the House
Intelligence Committee,

113
00:07:47,367 --> 00:07:49,368
then the staff member
that I personally knew there,

114
00:07:49,402 --> 00:07:52,704
and, uh, she then went to
the chairman of that committee.

115
00:07:52,738 --> 00:07:55,507
Nancy Pelosi was
the minority rep.

116
00:07:56,267 --> 00:07:59,501
They were all briefed into the
program at the time, by the way,

117
00:07:59,556 --> 00:08:01,630
and all the other
programs that were going on,

118
00:08:01,681 --> 00:08:04,182
including all these
CIA programs.

119
00:08:04,217 --> 00:08:07,252
I wasn't alone in this;
there were 4 others out of NSA, and

120
00:08:07,270 --> 00:08:09,754
we were all trying to work
internally in the government

121
00:08:09,772 --> 00:08:12,757
for... over these years trying
to get them to come around

122
00:08:12,775 --> 00:08:15,527
to being constitutionally
acceptable and take it into

123
00:08:15,561 --> 00:08:18,146
the courts and have the courts'
oversight of it, too.

124
00:08:18,314 --> 00:08:21,767
So we... we naively kept
thinking that that could, uh,

125
00:08:21,857 --> 00:08:25,560
that could happen,
and, uh, it never did.

126
00:08:26,376 --> 00:08:29,732
But any rate, after that,
and all the stuff we were doing,

127
00:08:29,787 --> 00:08:33,945
they decided to, uh, raid us, to keep
us quiet, threaten us, you know.

128
00:08:33,963 --> 00:08:37,070
So we were raided, um,
simultaneously, 4 of us.

129
00:08:37,140 --> 00:08:38,884
In my case, they came in
with guns drawn.

130
00:08:38,918 --> 00:08:42,137
I don't know why they did that,
but they did, so...

131
00:09:01,446 --> 00:09:03,039
<i>"Laura,</i>

132
00:09:03,086 --> 00:09:06,411
<i>"I will answer what I remember of
your questions as best I can.</i>

133
00:09:06,446 --> 00:09:08,947
<i>"Forgive the lack of structure;
I am not a writer,</i>

134
00:09:08,998 --> 00:09:12,334
<i>"and I have to draft this
in a great hurry.</i>

135
00:09:12,860 --> 00:09:16,421
<i>"What you know
as Stellar Wind has grown.</i>

136
00:09:16,456 --> 00:09:19,708
<i>"SSO, the expanded
Special Source Operations</i>

137
00:09:19,759 --> 00:09:22,377
<i>"that took over Stellar Wind's
share of the pie,</i>

138
00:09:22,428 --> 00:09:25,430
<i>"has spread all over the world
to practically include</i>

139
00:09:25,465 --> 00:09:28,433
<i>"comprehensive coverage
of the United States.</i>

140
00:09:28,639 --> 00:09:32,137
<i>"Disturbingly, the amount of
U.S. communication ingested</i>

141
00:09:32,171 --> 00:09:35,107
<i>"by NSA is still increasing.</i>

142
00:09:35,141 --> 00:09:37,893
<i>"Publicly, we complain
that things are going dark,</i>

143
00:09:37,944 --> 00:09:41,113
<i>"but in fact, our accesses
are improving.</i>

144
00:09:41,147 --> 00:09:43,949
<i>"The truth is that the NSA
has never in its history</i>

145
00:09:43,983 --> 00:09:46,818
<i>"collected more than
it does now.</i>

146
00:09:48,237 --> 00:09:51,689
<i>"I know the location of most
domestic interception points</i>

147
00:09:51,707 --> 00:09:54,076
<i>"and that the largest
telecommunication companies</i>

148
00:09:54,127 --> 00:09:57,195
<i>"in the U.S. are betraying
the trust of their customers,</i>

149
00:09:57,213 --> 00:09:59,498
<i>"which I can prove.</i>

150
00:09:59,532 --> 00:10:01,866
<i>"We are building the greatest
weapon for oppression</i>

151
00:10:01,884 --> 00:10:04,369
<i>"in the history of man,
yet its directors</i>

152
00:10:04,387 --> 00:10:07,839
<i>"exempt themselves
from accountability.</i>

153
00:10:08,021 --> 00:10:11,543
<i>"NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,</i>

154
00:10:11,561 --> 00:10:13,711
<i>"which I can prove.</i>

155
00:10:14,013 --> 00:10:18,150
<i>"Billions of U.S. communications
are being intercepted.</i>

156
00:10:18,668 --> 00:10:20,582
<i>"In gathering evidence
of wrongdoing,</i>

157
00:10:20,598 --> 00:10:23,054
<i>"I focused on the wronging of
the American people,</i>

158
00:10:23,072 --> 00:10:26,024
<i>"but believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under</i>

159
00:10:26,058 --> 00:10:30,078
<i>"is the highest privilege compared to
how we treat the rest of the world.</i>

160
00:10:30,113 --> 00:10:32,897
<i>"This I can also prove.</i>

161
00:10:33,274 --> 00:10:36,071
<i>"On cyber operations,
the government's public position</i>

162
00:10:36,102 --> 00:10:38,587
<i>"is that we still lack
a policy framework.</i>

163
00:10:38,621 --> 00:10:40,071
<i>"This, too, is a lie.</i>

164
00:10:40,089 --> 00:10:42,240
<i>"There is a detailed
policy framework,</i>

165
00:10:42,258 --> 00:10:44,796
<i>"a kind of martial law
for cyber operations</i>

166
00:10:44,828 --> 00:10:46,578
<i>"created by the White House.</i>

167
00:10:46,596 --> 00:10:48,836
<i>"It's called Presidential
Policy Directive 20</i>

168
00:10:48,898 --> 00:10:51,804
<i>"and was finalized at
the end of last year.</i>

169
00:10:51,859 --> 00:10:54,386
<i>"This I can also prove.</i>

170
00:10:54,576 --> 00:10:57,077
<i>"I appreciate your concern
for my safety,</i>

171
00:10:57,099 --> 00:10:59,441
<i>"but I already know how
this will end for me,</i>

172
00:10:59,475 --> 00:11:01,545
<i>"and I accept the risk.</i>

173
00:11:01,584 --> 00:11:04,095
<i>"If I have luck
and you are careful,</i>

174
00:11:04,113 --> 00:11:06,264
<i>"you will have
everything you need.</i>

175
00:11:06,282 --> 00:11:09,267
<i>"I ask only that you ensure
this information makes it home</i>

176
00:11:09,285 --> 00:11:11,603
<i>"to the American public."</i>

177
00:11:11,988 --> 00:11:16,992
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens' emails?

178
00:11:17,033 --> 00:11:18,238
No.

179
00:11:19,629 --> 00:11:25,444
Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations?

180
00:11:25,467 --> 00:11:26,644
No.

181
00:11:26,687 --> 00:11:29,210
- Google searches?
- No.

182
00:11:29,241 --> 00:11:31,686
- Text messages?
- No.

183
00:11:31,736 --> 00:11:34,794
- Amazon.com orders?
- No.

184
00:11:34,825 --> 00:11:36,728
- Bank records?
- No.

185
00:11:36,762 --> 00:11:43,401
What judicial consent is required
for NSA to intercept communications

186
00:11:43,436 --> 00:11:46,688
and information involving
American citizens?

187
00:11:46,739 --> 00:11:49,691
Within the United States,
that would be the FBI lead.

188
00:11:49,742 --> 00:11:52,027
If it was a foreign actor
in the United States,

189
00:11:52,078 --> 00:11:54,196
the FBI would still have the
lead and could work that

190
00:11:54,247 --> 00:11:58,700
with the... with NSA or other
intelligence agencies as authorized.

191
00:11:58,751 --> 00:12:02,775
But to conduct that kind of... of
collection in the United States,

192
00:12:02,814 --> 00:12:05,423
it would have to go
through a court order,

193
00:12:05,458 --> 00:12:07,425
and the court would have
to authorize it.

194
00:12:07,460 --> 00:12:10,431
We're not authorized to
do it, nor do we do it.

195
00:12:18,471 --> 00:12:20,472
All rise.

196
00:12:20,506 --> 00:12:24,943
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is now in session.

197
00:12:25,560 --> 00:12:27,612
<i>Please be seated.</i>

198
00:12:35,801 --> 00:12:38,753
Good morning, and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.

199
00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:44,713
The first case for argument is Jewel
versus National Security Agency.

200
00:12:44,747 --> 00:12:47,382
You may proceed.

201
00:12:49,168 --> 00:12:51,035
May it please the court,
Kevin Bankston

202
00:12:51,053 --> 00:12:55,557
for Carolyn Jewel and her fellow
plaintiff appellants in Jewel v. NSA.

203
00:12:55,591 --> 00:12:59,561
Your Honours, plaintiffs
have specifically alleged

204
00:12:59,595 --> 00:13:02,251
that their own communications
and communications records

205
00:13:02,290 --> 00:13:04,258
have been acquired
by the government.

206
00:13:04,340 --> 00:13:07,009
But the District Court found
that we had failed

207
00:13:07,053 --> 00:13:09,971
to allege facts that
differentiated the injury

208
00:13:10,006 --> 00:13:12,474
that our plaintiffs suffered
from the injuries suffered

209
00:13:12,508 --> 00:13:14,926
by every other AT&T user

210
00:13:14,960 --> 00:13:17,980
whose communications and records have
been acquired by the government,

211
00:13:18,026 --> 00:13:23,519
basically concluding that so long as everyone is
being surveilled, no one has standing to sue.

212
00:13:23,542 --> 00:13:26,188
Uh, however, to deny standing
to persons who are injured

213
00:13:26,239 --> 00:13:29,357
simply because many others
are also injured would mean

214
00:13:29,408 --> 00:13:31,576
that the most injurious and
widespread government actions

215
00:13:31,611 --> 00:13:33,245
could be questioned by nobody.

216
00:13:33,279 --> 00:13:35,697
<i>Do you have anything
concrete that, in fact,</i>

217
00:13:35,748 --> 00:13:38,500
<i>a specific communication</i>

218
00:13:38,534 --> 00:13:41,776
<i>of your client was intercepted?</i>

219
00:13:41,830 --> 00:13:44,456
We have evidence that
all the communications passing

220
00:13:44,490 --> 00:13:47,459
between AT&T's network
and, uh, other networks

221
00:13:47,493 --> 00:13:50,428
in their Northern California
facility have been intercepted.

222
00:13:50,463 --> 00:13:53,465
And so that would necessarily
include the Internet communications

223
00:13:53,499 --> 00:13:56,436
of our Northern California,
uh, plaintiffs.

224
00:13:56,467 --> 00:13:58,413
- So...
<i>- Okay, thank you.</i>

225
00:13:58,444 --> 00:14:00,021
Thank you, Your Honours.

226
00:14:06,402 --> 00:14:09,322
May it please the court, I am Thomas
Byron from the Department of Justice,

227
00:14:09,348 --> 00:14:11,729
here on behalf of
the government defendants.

228
00:14:11,823 --> 00:14:16,388
We think this litigation need
not be resolved in federal court

229
00:14:16,422 --> 00:14:19,591
in light of the oversight
of the political branches,

230
00:14:19,625 --> 00:14:22,043
both legislative and executive,

231
00:14:22,078 --> 00:14:25,901
which provides
a better opportunity

232
00:14:25,956 --> 00:14:29,050
for oversight and resolution
of the concerns raised

233
00:14:29,085 --> 00:14:33,555
concerning nationwide policies
of alleged surveillance,

234
00:14:33,589 --> 00:14:35,707
uh, in... in these...
in these complaints...

235
00:14:35,725 --> 00:14:38,727
Even if it's revealed that one
or more of the plaintiffs

236
00:14:38,761 --> 00:14:42,077
had email or telephone
conversations intercepted

237
00:14:42,124 --> 00:14:45,233
that had nothing to do
with national security?

238
00:14:45,268 --> 00:14:47,736
Your Honour, I don't
know that anyone necessarily

239
00:14:47,770 --> 00:14:50,388
would have standing to raise
the particular claims

240
00:14:50,406 --> 00:14:52,656
at issue in these two cases.

241
00:14:52,702 --> 00:14:55,827
We think instead
that the kinds of claims

242
00:14:55,861 --> 00:14:58,830
at issue here against
these defendants

243
00:14:58,864 --> 00:15:01,283
are those that are better
suited to resolution

244
00:15:01,334 --> 00:15:03,702
before the... the representative
branches of our government.

245
00:15:03,736 --> 00:15:07,238
<i>So what role would
the, uh, judiciary have,</i>

246
00:15:07,270 --> 00:15:11,420
<i>uh, if your, uh,
approach is adopted?</i>

247
00:15:11,463 --> 00:15:13,146
Judge Pregerson,
I think that the...

248
00:15:13,177 --> 00:15:16,481
<i>I mean, we just... just get
out of the way? Is that it?</i>

249
00:15:16,520 --> 00:15:19,417
Well, Judge Pregerson, I think
that there is a narrow category,

250
00:15:19,435 --> 00:15:23,588
a subset of cases, in which
it may be appropriate

251
00:15:23,606 --> 00:15:27,121
to step aside for that
narrow category of cases.

252
00:15:27,168 --> 00:15:29,894
<i>But the judiciary plays a role.</i>

253
00:15:29,928 --> 00:15:32,397
- To be sure, Judge Pregerson...
<i>- ...in our system.</i>

254
00:15:32,431 --> 00:15:35,801
Yes, Your Honour. And we
don't mean to diminish that.

255
00:15:35,840 --> 00:15:38,936
<i>You know, you're asking
us to abdicate that role.</i>

256
00:15:38,969 --> 00:15:40,964
No, Your Honour, um,
but it is a question

257
00:15:40,988 --> 00:15:44,125
of this court's discretion
whether to reach that issue.

258
00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:46,444
Um, we do think that
there is simply no way

259
00:15:46,462 --> 00:15:51,132
for the litigation to proceed without
risk of divulging those very questions

260
00:15:51,167 --> 00:15:53,635
of privileged information
that would cause,

261
00:15:53,669 --> 00:15:56,471
as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,

262
00:15:56,505 --> 00:16:00,592
exceptionally grave damage to
national security if disclosed.

263
00:16:04,313 --> 00:16:06,531
<i>So thanks for having me.</i>

264
00:16:06,578 --> 00:16:09,967
If anybody has any questions, like I said,
just... basically just raise your hand

265
00:16:09,985 --> 00:16:12,970
and I'll try to call on you
as soon as I possibly can.

266
00:16:12,988 --> 00:16:16,991
So who here actually feels like
they are under surveillance

267
00:16:17,166 --> 00:16:18,633
pretty regularly?

268
00:16:19,394 --> 00:16:21,104
Everyone at Occupy is, no?

269
00:16:21,119 --> 00:16:22,159
Everyone inside of Occupy.

270
00:16:22,164 --> 00:16:24,470
How many people here have been
arrested and had their...

271
00:16:24,501 --> 00:16:27,141
at their court date, they had their
phone taken into the back room?

272
00:16:27,446 --> 00:16:30,505
How many people here had
their retina scanned?

273
00:16:30,884 --> 00:16:31,972
Wow.

274
00:16:32,009 --> 00:16:34,542
Um, so you guys are
actually, in a sense,

275
00:16:34,593 --> 00:16:36,507
the canaries
in the coal mine, right?

276
00:16:36,561 --> 00:16:38,947
Because the incentives are all
lined up against you.

277
00:16:39,347 --> 00:16:43,200
Any of you see on the subway,
"Link your MetroCard to your debit card"?

278
00:16:43,319 --> 00:16:45,002
- Yeah.
- Right? On, like, auto refill?

279
00:16:45,020 --> 00:16:47,700
This is a concept which is key to
everything we'll talk about today,

280
00:16:47,723 --> 00:16:50,475
and it's called linkability.
Take one piece of data

281
00:16:50,509 --> 00:16:52,510
and link it to another
piece of data.

282
00:16:52,528 --> 00:16:56,064
So, for example, if you have your
MetroCard and you have your debit card,

283
00:16:56,115 --> 00:16:58,566
you have those things and you can
draw a line between them, right?

284
00:16:58,617 --> 00:17:01,119
So that's, like,
not a scary thing,

285
00:17:01,153 --> 00:17:04,021
except your bank card is tied
to everything else that you do

286
00:17:04,039 --> 00:17:08,356
during the day, so now they know where
you're going, when you make purchases.

287
00:17:08,449 --> 00:17:11,780
So when they decide to target you, they
can actually re-create your exact steps

288
00:17:11,814 --> 00:17:14,499
with a MetroCard and with
a credit card alone.

289
00:17:14,533 --> 00:17:16,501
Like, literally where you go
and what you buy,

290
00:17:16,535 --> 00:17:21,433
and potentially, by linking that data with
other people on similar travel plans,

291
00:17:21,503 --> 00:17:24,320
they can figure out who you
talk to and who you met with.

292
00:17:24,355 --> 00:17:27,545
When you then take cell phone
data, which logs your location,

293
00:17:27,563 --> 00:17:29,714
and you link up purchasing data,

294
00:17:29,732 --> 00:17:32,216
MetroCard data,
and your debit card,

295
00:17:32,482 --> 00:17:34,886
you start to get what
you could call "metadata"

296
00:17:34,904 --> 00:17:37,021
in aggregate
over a person's life.

297
00:17:37,055 --> 00:17:40,057
And metadata,
in aggregate, is content.

298
00:17:40,075 --> 00:17:43,301
It tells a story about you
which is made up of facts,

299
00:17:43,317 --> 00:17:45,029
but is not necessarily true.

300
00:17:45,063 --> 00:17:49,066
So, for example, just because you were on the
corner and all those data points point to it,

301
00:17:49,084 --> 00:17:50,914
it doesn't mean
you committed the crime.

302
00:17:50,961 --> 00:17:55,031
So it's important to note that if someone has
a perception of you having done a thing,

303
00:17:55,053 --> 00:17:57,688
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.

304
00:17:57,757 --> 00:18:00,512
So just keep in mind that what
happens to you guys, for example,

305
00:18:00,546 --> 00:18:04,420
with fingerprints and
retinal scans and photographs,

306
00:18:04,475 --> 00:18:06,751
that is what is going to happen
to people in the future

307
00:18:06,769 --> 00:18:09,237
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest

308
00:18:09,271 --> 00:18:12,740
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.

309
00:18:12,775 --> 00:18:15,537
This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front,

310
00:18:15,576 --> 00:18:18,396
and I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer

311
00:18:18,430 --> 00:18:21,068
because I know Senator
Feinstein wants to move on.

312
00:18:21,131 --> 00:18:26,076
So, does the NSA collect
any type of data at all

313
00:18:26,123 --> 00:18:29,958
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?

314
00:18:30,507 --> 00:18:31,993
No, sir.

315
00:18:32,382 --> 00:18:34,496
It does not?

316
00:18:34,781 --> 00:18:36,681
Not wittingly.

317
00:18:37,093 --> 00:18:39,951
There are cases where
they could inadvertently,

318
00:18:39,969 --> 00:18:43,888
perhaps, uh, collect, but not...
not wittingly.

319
00:18:44,118 --> 00:18:45,401
All right.

320
00:19:09,888 --> 00:19:13,451
"The encrypted archive should be
available to you within 7 days.

321
00:19:13,695 --> 00:19:16,831
"The key will follow
when everything else is done.

322
00:19:18,375 --> 00:19:21,509
"The material I provide and
investigative effort required

323
00:19:21,544 --> 00:19:23,962
"will be too much
for any one person.

324
00:19:23,996 --> 00:19:27,465
"I recommend, at a very minimum,
you involve Glenn Greenwald.

325
00:19:27,499 --> 00:19:29,634
"I believe you know him.

326
00:19:31,353 --> 00:19:36,571
"The plain text of the payload will include
my true name details for the record,

327
00:19:36,634 --> 00:19:41,907
"though it will be your decision as to
whether or how to declare my involvement.

328
00:19:41,941 --> 00:19:46,696
"My personal desire is that you paint
the target directly on my back.

329
00:19:46,741 --> 00:19:51,355
"No one, not even my most trusted
confidant, is aware of my intentions,

330
00:19:51,373 --> 00:19:56,076
"and it would not be fair for them to
fall under suspicion for my actions.

331
00:19:56,099 --> 00:19:59,998
"You may be the only one who can prevent
that, and that is by immediately nailing me

332
00:20:00,032 --> 00:20:03,952
"to the cross, rather than trying
to protect me as a source.

333
00:20:06,212 --> 00:20:10,064
"On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong,

334
00:20:10,096 --> 00:20:15,263
"the first rendezvous attempt will
be at 10 a.m. local time on Monday.

335
00:20:15,326 --> 00:20:20,313
"We will meet in the hallway outside
of the restaurant in the Mira Hotel.

336
00:20:20,567 --> 00:20:24,802
"I will be working on a Rubik's
Cube so you can identify me.

337
00:20:24,854 --> 00:20:28,775
"Approach me, and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.

338
00:20:28,827 --> 00:20:33,831
"I'll respond by stating that I'm not sure
and suggest you try the lounge instead.

339
00:20:33,866 --> 00:20:38,336
"I'll offer to show you where it
is, and at that point we're good.

340
00:20:38,370 --> 00:20:41,339
"You simply need
to follow naturally."

341
00:21:17,992 --> 00:21:20,624
As far as positioning, I
mean, if you want us to sit

342
00:21:20,662 --> 00:21:21,913
in any particular way
or whatever...

343
00:21:21,945 --> 00:21:23,851
You know, I'm gonna...
I'm gonna go over there.

344
00:21:23,883 --> 00:21:26,484
<i>- Okay.
- I can get better light.</i>

345
00:21:30,992 --> 00:21:32,943
<i>This one will...</i>

346
00:21:34,244 --> 00:21:36,627
So this...
um, there's, you know,

347
00:21:36,645 --> 00:21:40,346
so many different,
enormous stories

348
00:21:40,383 --> 00:21:42,369
just that are kind of
stand-alone stories.

349
00:21:42,408 --> 00:21:44,752
- Mm-hmm.
- Um, that even,

350
00:21:44,768 --> 00:21:46,861
like, you know, certain things
about an individual document

351
00:21:46,907 --> 00:21:48,868
that can just be
their own story.

352
00:21:48,923 --> 00:21:51,192
Um, and I just want to start
churning those stories out.

353
00:21:51,243 --> 00:21:54,245
I... I basically woke up this morning
and already started writing stories.

354
00:21:54,279 --> 00:21:59,534
Um, so I'm hoping to, you know, start
publishing within, like, a day or two days...

355
00:21:59,585 --> 00:22:01,586
- Okay.
- ...as long as you're good with that.

356
00:22:01,620 --> 00:22:03,087
- Yeah.
- Um, and,

357
00:22:03,122 --> 00:22:06,049
so, as far as, like, the
stuff we have to talk about,

358
00:22:06,098 --> 00:22:08,766
I mean, I'm kind of,
like, dichotomizing it,

359
00:22:08,799 --> 00:22:11,737
um, between, you know,

360
00:22:11,768 --> 00:22:14,015
stuff that I'd like to talk to
you about in terms of, like,

361
00:22:14,049 --> 00:22:16,050
the documents and the content, and
Laura has a bunch of questions

362
00:22:16,101 --> 00:22:18,382
about that as well, sort of working
through the documents,

363
00:22:18,421 --> 00:22:21,218
getting your take on a
lot of this stuff that,

364
00:22:21,304 --> 00:22:25,443
you know, will help me understand it better, but
then, also, the sort of "you" story, right?

365
00:22:25,477 --> 00:22:27,395
- Like, the who you are...
- Yeah.

366
00:22:27,446 --> 00:22:29,731
Why... what you've done, why
you've done what you've done.

367
00:22:29,782 --> 00:22:31,680
- Yeah.
- And I'd love to do that first...

368
00:22:31,719 --> 00:22:34,133
- Okay.
- Um, in part because

369
00:22:34,195 --> 00:22:35,976
- you're the only one who could do that, so...
- Yeah.

370
00:22:35,999 --> 00:22:38,122
I'd like to just get it
done so that it's done,

371
00:22:38,157 --> 00:22:40,742
um, and also because,
you know, it might be

372
00:22:40,793 --> 00:22:42,744
- that you want to do that early...
- Yeah.

373
00:22:42,795 --> 00:22:45,129
- Because...
- Who knows what could happen, yeah.

374
00:22:45,164 --> 00:22:47,415
It might be necessary, we might
choose to have that done early.

375
00:22:47,466 --> 00:22:50,418
What are your... tell me your thoughts
on just where you are with that.

376
00:22:50,469 --> 00:22:53,971
So, the primary one on that... I think
I've expressed it a couple times online...

377
00:22:54,006 --> 00:22:56,474
is... I feel the modern media

378
00:22:56,508 --> 00:22:59,210
has a big focus
on personalities.

379
00:22:59,228 --> 00:23:01,547
- Totally.
- And I'm a little concerned

380
00:23:01,609 --> 00:23:04,640
the more we... focus on that,

381
00:23:04,706 --> 00:23:07,708
the more they're gonna use
that as a distraction, um,

382
00:23:07,859 --> 00:23:09,887
and I... I don't necessarily
want that to happen,

383
00:23:09,905 --> 00:23:12,056
which is why I've
consistently said, you know,

384
00:23:12,074 --> 00:23:14,242
"I'm not the story here."

385
00:23:14,276 --> 00:23:16,479
Um... ha ha ha! Nervous, huh?

386
00:23:16,526 --> 00:23:18,229
That was a very,
very cheap pen...

387
00:23:18,247 --> 00:23:20,012
that just, with the
slightest force, broke.

388
00:23:20,055 --> 00:23:22,056
- Go ahead.
- Um...

389
00:23:22,098 --> 00:23:24,252
but, uh, yeah.

390
00:23:24,286 --> 00:23:27,288
Anything I can do
to help you guys, uh,

391
00:23:27,339 --> 00:23:29,257
get this out, I will do.

392
00:23:29,299 --> 00:23:33,459
I don't have, uh, any
experience with media,

393
00:23:33,568 --> 00:23:37,248
uh, with how this works,
um, so I'm kind of,

394
00:23:37,266 --> 00:23:39,117
uh, learning as I go.

395
00:23:39,479 --> 00:23:41,729
<i>Right, so I just want
to get a sense of</i>

396
00:23:41,753 --> 00:23:43,633
<i>why did you decide
to do what you've done?</i>

397
00:23:43,655 --> 00:23:45,773
So, for me,
it... it all comes down

398
00:23:45,808 --> 00:23:49,110
to state power against
the people's ability

399
00:23:49,144 --> 00:23:51,612
to meaningfully oppose
that power.

400
00:23:51,647 --> 00:23:54,615
And I'm sitting there,
uh, every day

401
00:23:54,650 --> 00:23:57,935
getting paid to design methods

402
00:23:57,953 --> 00:24:01,072
to amplify that state power.

403
00:24:01,106 --> 00:24:03,241
And I'm realizing
that if, you know,

404
00:24:03,275 --> 00:24:06,077
the policy switches
that are the only things

405
00:24:06,111 --> 00:24:09,895
that restrain these states,
uh, were changed,

406
00:24:09,957 --> 00:24:12,583
there... you couldn't
meaningfully oppose these.

407
00:24:12,617 --> 00:24:14,211
I mean, you would have to be

408
00:24:14,237 --> 00:24:17,889
the most incredibly sophisticated
technical actor in existence.

409
00:24:17,930 --> 00:24:22,562
I mean, I'm not sure there's anybody,
no matter how gifted you are,

410
00:24:22,602 --> 00:24:27,375
uh, who could oppose all of the offices
and all of the bright people...

411
00:24:27,461 --> 00:24:29,600
even all the mediocre
people out there...

412
00:24:29,634 --> 00:24:32,296
with all of their tools
and all their capabilities.

413
00:24:32,343 --> 00:24:36,407
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration

414
00:24:36,441 --> 00:24:39,709
be betrayed and walked
away from and, in fact,

415
00:24:39,772 --> 00:24:42,146
- actually advance...
- Uh-huh, uh-huh.

416
00:24:42,164 --> 00:24:45,695
...the things that had been
promised to be sort of

417
00:24:45,718 --> 00:24:48,619
curtailed and reined in
and dialled back,

418
00:24:48,653 --> 00:24:51,322
and actually get worse,
particularly drone strikes...

419
00:24:51,340 --> 00:24:53,324
which I also learned
at NSA, we could...

420
00:24:53,342 --> 00:24:56,344
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops...

421
00:24:56,378 --> 00:25:00,131
um... uh, as... as I saw that,

422
00:25:00,165 --> 00:25:02,333
that really hardened me
to action.

423
00:25:02,351 --> 00:25:04,352
- In real time?
- In real time, yeah.

424
00:25:04,386 --> 00:25:06,337
You... it'll stream

425
00:25:06,355 --> 00:25:09,340
a lower quality of the video
to your desktop.

426
00:25:09,358 --> 00:25:11,475
Typically you'd be watching
surveillance drones

427
00:25:11,509 --> 00:25:13,677
as opposed to actually, like,
you know, murder drones,

428
00:25:13,695 --> 00:25:15,813
where they're going
out there and bomb somebody.

429
00:25:15,847 --> 00:25:18,849
But you'll have a drone that's
just following somebody's house

430
00:25:18,867 --> 00:25:21,685
for hours and hours,
and you won't know who it is

431
00:25:21,937 --> 00:25:24,589
because, you know, you don't
have the context for that.

432
00:25:24,609 --> 00:25:28,192
But it's just a page,
where it's lists and lists

433
00:25:28,210 --> 00:25:30,678
of drone feeds in all of
these different countries,

434
00:25:30,712 --> 00:25:32,560
under all these different
code names,

435
00:25:32,631 --> 00:25:35,766
and you can just click on
which one you want to see.

436
00:25:37,029 --> 00:25:39,904
<i>Right, but...
so if your self-interest is</i>

437
00:25:39,938 --> 00:25:42,700
<i>to live in a world in which
there's maximum privacy,</i>

438
00:25:42,771 --> 00:25:45,576
<i>doing something that could
put you into prison,</i>

439
00:25:45,611 --> 00:25:48,062
in which your privacy is
completely destroyed,

440
00:25:48,096 --> 00:25:50,047
is sort of
the antithesis of that.

441
00:25:50,065 --> 00:25:54,101
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?

442
00:25:54,152 --> 00:25:57,721
I remember what the Internet was
like before it was being watched,

443
00:25:57,739 --> 00:26:00,658
and there's never been anything in
the history of man that's like it.

444
00:26:00,692 --> 00:26:05,729
I mean, you could, again, have
children from one part of the world

445
00:26:05,747 --> 00:26:08,532
having an equal discussion

446
00:26:08,566 --> 00:26:12,080
where, you know, they were
sort of granted, um,

447
00:26:12,127 --> 00:26:15,239
the same respect for their
ideas and conversation,

448
00:26:15,257 --> 00:26:18,209
with experts in a field from
another part of the world

449
00:26:18,243 --> 00:26:22,438
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all of the time.

450
00:26:22,485 --> 00:26:25,016
Um, and it was... it was
free and unrestrained,

451
00:26:25,050 --> 00:26:29,020
and we've seen, uh, the... the
chilling of that, the cooling of that,

452
00:26:29,054 --> 00:26:32,857
and the changing of that model toward
something in which people self-police

453
00:26:32,891 --> 00:26:37,228
their own views, and they literally make
jokes about ending up on "the list"

454
00:26:37,262 --> 00:26:39,730
if they donate
to a political cause

455
00:26:39,764 --> 00:26:42,283
or if they say something
in a discussion.

456
00:26:42,317 --> 00:26:46,904
Uh, and it's become an expectation
that we're being watched.

457
00:26:46,938 --> 00:26:50,074
Um, many people I've talked to have
mentioned that they're careful about

458
00:26:50,108 --> 00:26:53,744
what they type into search engines because
they know that it's being recorded,

459
00:26:53,778 --> 00:26:58,790
and that limits the boundaries of
their intellectual exploration.

460
00:26:58,868 --> 00:27:02,970
Uh... and... I'm...

461
00:27:03,540 --> 00:27:06,290
I am more willing to...

462
00:27:06,308 --> 00:27:09,126
risk... imprisonment

463
00:27:09,144 --> 00:27:12,756
or any other negative
outcome, personally,

464
00:27:12,787 --> 00:27:16,467
than I am willing to risk

465
00:27:16,485 --> 00:27:19,153
the curtailment
of my intellectual freedom

466
00:27:19,187 --> 00:27:22,639
and that of those around me

467
00:27:22,657 --> 00:27:26,594
whom I care for, uh, equally
as I... I do for myself.

468
00:27:26,628 --> 00:27:29,813
And again, that... that's not to
say that I am self-sacrificing

469
00:27:29,831 --> 00:27:33,617
because it gives me...
I feel good

470
00:27:33,651 --> 00:27:38,789
in my human experience to know that I
can contribute to the good of others.

471
00:27:53,830 --> 00:27:56,173
<i>Uh, could you elaborate on that?</i>

472
00:27:56,208 --> 00:28:00,677
So, uh, I don't know how much of the...
programs

473
00:28:00,695 --> 00:28:03,847
and the actual technical capacities
everybody's talked to you about,

474
00:28:03,865 --> 00:28:05,849
but there's
an infrastructure in place

475
00:28:05,867 --> 00:28:08,869
in the United States
and worldwide

476
00:28:09,521 --> 00:28:11,802
that NSA has built,

477
00:28:11,833 --> 00:28:16,377
in cooperation with
other governments as well...

478
00:28:16,731 --> 00:28:20,183
that intercepts

479
00:28:20,404 --> 00:28:23,598
basically every digital
communication,

480
00:28:23,606 --> 00:28:28,139
every radio communication,
every analogue communication

481
00:28:28,173 --> 00:28:31,559
that it has sensors
in place to detect.

482
00:28:31,686 --> 00:28:36,190
And, uh, with these
capabilities, basically,

483
00:28:36,397 --> 00:28:39,049
the... the vast majority

484
00:28:39,067 --> 00:28:43,220
of human and, uh,
computer-to-computer communications,

485
00:28:43,238 --> 00:28:48,242
device-based communications, which sort of
inform the relationships between humans,

486
00:28:48,276 --> 00:28:52,246
um, are automatically
ingested without targeting.

487
00:28:52,639 --> 00:28:56,455
And that allows individuals
to retroactively

488
00:28:56,486 --> 00:29:00,754
search your communications
based on self-certifications.

489
00:29:00,789 --> 00:29:03,924
So, for example,
if I wanted to see

490
00:29:03,959 --> 00:29:07,428
the content of your email
or, you know,

491
00:29:07,587 --> 00:29:10,723
your wife's phone calls
or anything like that,

492
00:29:10,788 --> 00:29:14,958
um, all I have to do is use
what's called a "selector,"

493
00:29:15,032 --> 00:29:17,828
um, any kind of...

494
00:29:17,875 --> 00:29:22,157
thing in the communications
chain that might uniquely

495
00:29:22,211 --> 00:29:25,112
or almost uniquely identify
you as an individual.

496
00:29:25,147 --> 00:29:27,482
And I'm talking about things
like email addresses,

497
00:29:27,529 --> 00:29:30,795
IP addresses,
phone numbers, credit cards,

498
00:29:30,873 --> 00:29:34,288
um, even passwords
that are unique to you,

499
00:29:34,322 --> 00:29:36,592
that aren't used by anyone else.

500
00:29:36,639 --> 00:29:39,819
Um, I can input those
into the system,

501
00:29:39,878 --> 00:29:42,296
and it will not only go back
through the database and go,

502
00:29:42,330 --> 00:29:45,916
"Have I seen this
anywhere in the past?"

503
00:29:45,967 --> 00:29:49,303
It will, um, basically
put an additional level

504
00:29:49,337 --> 00:29:52,289
of scrutiny on it,
moving into the future,

505
00:29:52,307 --> 00:29:55,959
that says, "If this is detected
now or at any time in the future,

506
00:29:55,977 --> 00:30:00,578
"I want this to go to me immediately
and alert me in real time"

507
00:30:00,621 --> 00:30:04,186
that you're communicating with
someone, things like that.

508
00:30:07,484 --> 00:30:10,324
So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.

509
00:30:10,358 --> 00:30:12,309
Okay. Um...

510
00:30:12,327 --> 00:30:15,996
I work for, uh,
Booz Allen Hamilton,

511
00:30:16,031 --> 00:30:18,148
a defence contractor.

512
00:30:18,166 --> 00:30:20,951
Uh, I'm sort of on loan to NSA.

513
00:30:20,985 --> 00:30:23,987
I don't talk to a Booz Allen boss, I
don't get tasking from Booz Allen;

514
00:30:24,005 --> 00:30:25,422
it's all from NSA.

515
00:30:25,457 --> 00:30:27,625
- Uh, so I don't know your name.
- Oh, ha!

516
00:30:27,659 --> 00:30:31,330
Sorry. I, uh... my name
is Edward Snowden.

517
00:30:31,346 --> 00:30:32,994
I go by Ed.

518
00:30:33,026 --> 00:30:35,666
Um, Edward Joseph Snowden
is the full name.

519
00:30:35,684 --> 00:30:36,833
Uh, S-N...

520
00:30:36,851 --> 00:30:39,260
O-W-D-E-N.

521
00:30:39,300 --> 00:30:41,034
And, uh, where are you from?

522
00:30:41,050 --> 00:30:44,448
Uh, I'm originally... I was
born in North Carolina,

523
00:30:44,491 --> 00:30:46,588
uh, small town, Elizabeth City.

524
00:30:46,645 --> 00:30:49,196
There's a Coast Guard station
there; I'm from a military family.

525
00:30:49,231 --> 00:30:51,815
- Yeah.
- But I spent most of my time

526
00:30:51,849 --> 00:30:55,319
growing up around, uh,
Fort Meade in Maryland.

527
00:30:56,579 --> 00:30:58,289
Uh, and your family,

528
00:30:58,323 --> 00:31:01,325
uh, what's the
consequences for them?

529
00:31:01,359 --> 00:31:05,496
This, uh, this is actually
what has made this hardest.

530
00:31:05,530 --> 00:31:09,500
Uh, my family doesn't know,
uh, what's happening.

531
00:31:09,534 --> 00:31:12,086
They're... they're unaware.
Um...

532
00:31:12,137 --> 00:31:14,980
I don't think I'll...

533
00:31:15,012 --> 00:31:17,391
be able to keep the family ties

534
00:31:17,425 --> 00:31:22,049
that I've had for my life, um,

535
00:31:22,096 --> 00:31:25,516
because of the risk of
associating them, uh, with this.

536
00:31:25,550 --> 00:31:29,019
And I'll leave, you know,
what to publish on this

537
00:31:29,053 --> 00:31:31,080
and what not to publish
to you guys.

538
00:31:31,135 --> 00:31:33,824
I trust you to be
responsible on this.

539
00:31:34,006 --> 00:31:38,810
Um... but basically, the
closer I stay to my family,

540
00:31:38,818 --> 00:31:41,165
the more likely they are
to be leaned on...

541
00:31:41,196 --> 00:31:42,499
So you don't want me
to report this?

542
00:31:42,534 --> 00:31:44,001
I mean, we know that, yeah.

543
00:31:44,035 --> 00:31:46,003
We definitely want
to do whatever we can

544
00:31:46,037 --> 00:31:49,006
not to include them
or bring them into the mix.

545
00:31:49,040 --> 00:31:51,742
Sure, I... that's fine.
I won't...

546
00:31:51,760 --> 00:31:53,076
Let me now...
I'm sorry to interrupt you.

547
00:31:53,094 --> 00:31:54,911
Can we just stop for
a second, do the documents,

548
00:31:54,929 --> 00:31:56,733
and then go back to that?
That make sense?

549
00:31:56,796 --> 00:31:58,132
Uh, what do I need?

550
00:31:58,183 --> 00:32:00,934
Do I need an email address
that we're using, or...

551
00:32:00,969 --> 00:32:03,053
Well, so you can...
you can send them...

552
00:32:03,087 --> 00:32:06,475
once you've encrypted it, you can send it
from whatever you think is appropriate.

553
00:32:06,491 --> 00:32:09,059
The main thing is you've got
to encapsulate all of this...

554
00:32:09,093 --> 00:32:11,562
- Uh-huh.
- In a way that it can't

555
00:32:11,596 --> 00:32:13,697
- be decrypted and read...
- Right.

556
00:32:13,739 --> 00:32:15,866
- when it's in transit across the network...
- Right.

557
00:32:15,900 --> 00:32:18,869
...or on either of the end
points that it's received at.

558
00:32:18,903 --> 00:32:20,871
Okay, I mean, just so you know,
these documents are basically

559
00:32:20,905 --> 00:32:22,906
- all gonna be uploaded in, like...
- Yeah, and that's fine.

560
00:32:22,940 --> 00:32:24,875
You know, 48 hours,
72 hours, whatever.

561
00:32:24,909 --> 00:32:26,910
This is simply... you know, you
want to get in the process

562
00:32:26,944 --> 00:32:28,879
of doing this for everything
because it seems hard,

563
00:32:28,913 --> 00:32:30,625
- but it's not hard. This is super easy.
- Okay.

564
00:32:30,680 --> 00:32:33,050
- So just walk me through it, and...
- Okay.

565
00:32:33,084 --> 00:32:37,755
Show me... show me the actual folder
structure where these files are first.

566
00:32:40,411 --> 00:32:42,459
How many documents did
you say there were?

567
00:32:42,477 --> 00:32:43,927
- Seven.
- All right.

568
00:32:43,961 --> 00:32:45,763
- Well, while you're working...
- Okay, go ahead, yeah.

569
00:32:45,797 --> 00:32:47,564
- Did you want to...
- Okay.

570
00:32:48,372 --> 00:32:49,932
How many documents are
we talking about?

571
00:32:49,934 --> 00:32:52,102
Because when the
Guardian did WikiLeaks,

572
00:32:52,136 --> 00:32:54,706
technical people set up a system

573
00:32:54,737 --> 00:32:56,973
so that they were available
for anybody to see.

574
00:32:56,991 --> 00:32:58,642
- Mm-hmm.
- And I just wondered

575
00:32:58,660 --> 00:33:01,078
if it's possible to
do the same thing.

576
00:33:01,112 --> 00:33:04,291
That... that would be
the ideal end game,

577
00:33:04,311 --> 00:33:07,533
um, but... because...

578
00:33:07,585 --> 00:33:11,255
because some of these documents
are legitimately classified,

579
00:33:11,289 --> 00:33:14,962
in ways that could cause harm
to people and methods...

580
00:33:15,016 --> 00:33:19,263
um, I'm comfortable in my technical
ability, uh, to protect them.

581
00:33:19,297 --> 00:33:21,297
I mean, you could literally
shoot me or torture me,

582
00:33:21,299 --> 00:33:24,768
and I could not disclose
the password if I wanted to.

583
00:33:24,803 --> 00:33:28,772
Um... you know, I... I have
the sophistication to do that.

584
00:33:29,245 --> 00:33:32,744
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,

585
00:33:32,775 --> 00:33:35,011
but there are a number
of them that couldn't.

586
00:33:35,029 --> 00:33:37,180
But the question becomes,

587
00:33:37,198 --> 00:33:43,854
can an organization actually control
that information in that manner

588
00:33:43,872 --> 00:33:47,291
without risking basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?

589
00:33:47,325 --> 00:33:48,909
But I... I do agree with that.

590
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:52,789
Honestly, I don't want to be the
person making the decisions

591
00:33:52,820 --> 00:33:54,965
on what should be public
and what shouldn't,

592
00:33:54,999 --> 00:33:57,251
which is why... rather
than publishing these

593
00:33:57,302 --> 00:34:00,587
on my own, um, or putting
them out openly...

594
00:34:00,638 --> 00:34:02,639
- I'm running them through journalists...
- Yes.

595
00:34:02,674 --> 00:34:05,175
...so that my bias,
you know, and my things...

596
00:34:05,209 --> 00:34:08,076
because clearly I have
some strongly held views...

597
00:34:08,099 --> 00:34:11,482
are removed from that equation,
and the public interest

598
00:34:11,516 --> 00:34:13,768
is being represented in
the most responsible manner.

599
00:34:13,830 --> 00:34:15,569
Yeah.

600
00:34:15,603 --> 00:34:17,905
Actually, given... given your...

601
00:34:17,939 --> 00:34:21,742
sort of, you know,
geographic, uh...

602
00:34:21,776 --> 00:34:23,911
familiarity with the U.K.
and whatnot,

603
00:34:23,945 --> 00:34:27,915
I... I'd like to point out
that GCHQ, um,

604
00:34:27,949 --> 00:34:32,419
has, uh, probably
the most invasive...

605
00:34:32,454 --> 00:34:34,588
I've heard that, yeah.

606
00:34:34,622 --> 00:34:37,090
...network intercept program
anywhere in the world.

607
00:34:37,125 --> 00:34:39,626
- Yeah, yeah.
- Uh, it's called Tempora,

608
00:34:39,677 --> 00:34:41,745
T-E-M-P-O-R-A,

609
00:34:41,763 --> 00:34:45,081
and it's the world's first
"full take", they call it...

610
00:34:45,099 --> 00:34:49,052
and that means content in addition
to metadata, on everything.

611
00:34:51,461 --> 00:34:53,557
Um, so this...
this is what I'd like to do

612
00:34:53,591 --> 00:34:56,259
just in terms of scheduling, if
it's good with everybody else.

613
00:34:56,277 --> 00:34:58,261
Um, are you... do you feel
like you're done...

614
00:34:58,279 --> 00:35:00,030
- I am done, yeah. Okay.
- with what you...

615
00:35:00,064 --> 00:35:04,568
So I... I'm anxious to go back,
get those articles done,

616
00:35:04,602 --> 00:35:07,070
and then there's
a bunch of documents

617
00:35:07,104 --> 00:35:08,906
that aren't about those
first 2 or 3 stories

618
00:35:08,940 --> 00:35:10,574
- that I'd like to spend time with you...
- Sure, yeah.

619
00:35:10,608 --> 00:35:12,659
You know, kind of
going over, um, and...

620
00:35:12,701 --> 00:35:14,068
Ha ha! I'm not going anywhere!

621
00:35:14,142 --> 00:35:16,446
You think you're available? You
want to check your book first?

622
00:35:16,464 --> 00:35:19,449
Yeah! Let me, uh,
let me check my schedule.

623
00:35:19,467 --> 00:35:20,951
Is that good for you,
Laura? Do you want to...

624
00:35:20,969 --> 00:35:22,603
- It's great.
- Okay.

625
00:35:38,102 --> 00:35:40,053
Hello?

626
00:35:40,104 --> 00:35:41,521
Yes.

627
00:35:41,556 --> 00:35:45,192
Uh, my meal was great.
Thank you very much.

628
00:35:47,225 --> 00:35:50,163
Uh, no, I still have some left, and I
think I'm gonna be eating it later,

629
00:35:50,198 --> 00:35:53,333
so, uh, you can just
leave me alone for now.

630
00:35:54,669 --> 00:35:58,205
Okay, great. Thank you so much.
Have a good one. Bye.

631
00:36:00,208 --> 00:36:03,343
Let's, uh, fix that real quick.

632
00:36:05,946 --> 00:36:07,881
So, uh, another fun thing
I was telling Laura about:

633
00:36:07,932 --> 00:36:09,766
this... all of these
new VOIP phones,

634
00:36:09,801 --> 00:36:12,502
they have little computers in
them, and you can hot-mic these

635
00:36:12,520 --> 00:36:13,837
- over the network...
- Uh-huh.

636
00:36:13,855 --> 00:36:16,394
...all the time, even when
the receiver's down, so,

637
00:36:16,425 --> 00:36:18,827
as long as it's plugged in, it can
be listening in on you.

638
00:36:18,843 --> 00:36:21,812
And I hadn't... hadn't even
considered that earlier, but yeah.

639
00:36:21,846 --> 00:36:23,864
- Okay.
- There... there are so many ways we can...

640
00:36:23,898 --> 00:36:26,149
this could be...
everything that's in here

641
00:36:26,183 --> 00:36:28,680
is pretty much gonna be on
public record at some point.

642
00:36:28,758 --> 00:36:30,520
- We should operate on that...
- Yeah, yeah.

643
00:36:30,538 --> 00:36:32,155
- ...basis, because...
- I think we are.

644
00:36:32,189 --> 00:36:33,657
So, do you have your
airgapped machine with you?

645
00:36:33,691 --> 00:36:36,326
- I do, I do.
- You can pop that out.

646
00:36:40,012 --> 00:36:41,652
Do you have an understanding
or commitment

647
00:36:41,666 --> 00:36:44,301
on when you guys are going to
press with the first stories?

648
00:36:44,335 --> 00:36:47,370
Uh, it's about 7:00 or 8:00
in the morning in London.

649
00:36:47,388 --> 00:36:49,506
Uh-huh. Okay.

650
00:36:50,909 --> 00:36:53,176
Oh, let's see here.

651
00:37:00,285 --> 00:37:03,237
Oh, hey, look,
there's the other one.

652
00:37:03,277 --> 00:37:07,991
Pro tip: let's not leave the same SD cards
in our laptops forever, in the future.

653
00:37:08,026 --> 00:37:09,610
Heh!

654
00:37:14,463 --> 00:37:18,585
Did you know this was still kicking
around in your, uh, in your laptop?

655
00:37:18,620 --> 00:37:20,300
- Yeah, I mean, that was the... um,
- Okay.

656
00:37:20,338 --> 00:37:22,456
- Okay, just... just making sure.
- Okay. Yeah.

657
00:37:22,507 --> 00:37:25,588
Heh! This is that right there.

658
00:37:25,650 --> 00:37:27,928
You will have a new one
that looks exactly identical

659
00:37:27,962 --> 00:37:32,700
that's a different archive, so you might
want to take a Sharpie to it or something.

660
00:37:32,755 --> 00:37:35,469
Could you, uh, pass me my
magic, uh, mantle of power?

661
00:37:35,520 --> 00:37:37,454
- Sorry.
- Mm-hmm.

662
00:37:37,488 --> 00:37:40,057
I'm gonna go pick up...

663
00:37:44,248 --> 00:37:46,930
Is that about
the possibility of...

664
00:37:46,948 --> 00:37:49,449
Visual, yeah. Visual collection.

665
00:37:56,083 --> 00:37:57,324
I don't think, at this
point, there's anything

666
00:37:57,375 --> 00:37:59,966
in this regard
that will shock us.

667
00:38:00,529 --> 00:38:02,245
We've become pretty...

668
00:38:02,279 --> 00:38:04,247
in fact, Ewen said before,
he's like, he's like,

669
00:38:04,281 --> 00:38:06,750
"I'm never leaving my room." He's
like, "I'm never leaving anything

670
00:38:06,784 --> 00:38:08,151
"in my room again, not a single machine."

671
00:38:08,177 --> 00:38:10,297
I was like, "You've been
infected by the paranoia bug.

672
00:38:10,304 --> 00:38:13,256
"It happens to all of us!"

673
00:38:13,290 --> 00:38:15,291
And the way he said it, he was
like, "I would never leave

674
00:38:15,309 --> 00:38:17,728
a single device in
the room again alone."

675
00:38:18,574 --> 00:38:21,125
My bag is getting
heavier and heavier.

676
00:38:23,333 --> 00:38:26,131
- Your evil influence.
- That's your evil influence, Ed.

677
00:38:26,193 --> 00:38:29,003
All right, I'm going to need you
to enter your root password

678
00:38:29,004 --> 00:38:31,474
'cause I don't know what it is.

679
00:38:32,325 --> 00:38:34,911
If you want to use this,
you're more than welcome to.

680
00:38:35,133 --> 00:38:36,040
Okay.

681
00:38:36,066 --> 00:38:38,281
It looks like your root password's
about 4 characters long anyway.

682
00:38:38,315 --> 00:38:41,785
It's usually a lot longer, but that's
just, like, a one-time-only thing, right?

683
00:38:41,819 --> 00:38:44,320
- So it is, uh...
- It had been a lot longer,

684
00:38:44,338 --> 00:38:46,322
but ever since I knew
that it was just, like,

685
00:38:46,340 --> 00:38:48,825
a one-time-only session one,
I've been making it shorter.

686
00:38:48,843 --> 00:38:50,994
- Is that not good?
- It's actually not.

687
00:38:51,012 --> 00:38:53,463
I was expressing this
with Laura, either.

688
00:38:53,497 --> 00:38:56,466
The issue is, because of the fact
that it's got a hardware MAC address

689
00:38:56,500 --> 00:39:00,908
and things like that, if people are
able to identify your machine,

690
00:39:00,994 --> 00:39:01,721
and they're able to...

691
00:39:01,747 --> 00:39:04,024
Consider the fact you're about to
break the most upsetting story...

692
00:39:04,058 --> 00:39:05,649
- Right, that's true, that's true.
- Yeah,

693
00:39:05,688 --> 00:39:07,208
so they might kind
of prioritize you...

694
00:39:07,228 --> 00:39:09,479
It's 10 letters.
I type very quickly.

695
00:39:09,513 --> 00:39:11,014
- It actually is 10 letters.
- Okay.

696
00:39:11,032 --> 00:39:13,183
So 10 letters
would be good if they

697
00:39:13,201 --> 00:39:15,485
- had to brute-force the entire key space.
- Right.

698
00:39:15,519 --> 00:39:19,522
Um, that would still probably only
take a couple of days for NSA.

699
00:39:19,540 --> 00:39:21,541
Um...

700
00:39:22,654 --> 00:39:24,544
That's a fire alarm.

701
00:39:25,149 --> 00:39:26,496
Okay.

702
00:39:27,594 --> 00:39:32,085
Well, hopefully... it just sounds
like a 3-second test, or is...

703
00:39:32,784 --> 00:39:34,871
Do you want to call
the desk and ask?

704
00:39:35,607 --> 00:39:37,670
No. I think it's fine.

705
00:39:37,709 --> 00:39:39,676
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that it just...

706
00:39:39,710 --> 00:39:41,670
Has that happened before?

707
00:39:41,702 --> 00:39:45,766
Maybe they got mad that they couldn't
listen in to us via the phone anymore.

708
00:39:46,777 --> 00:39:49,436
Has the fire alarm
gone off before?

709
00:39:49,567 --> 00:39:52,309
No, that's the first
time that's happened.

710
00:39:52,371 --> 00:39:55,158
Yeah, see, just in case,
they've got, like, an alert

711
00:39:55,193 --> 00:39:59,196
that goes to... uh,
that's... that's unusual.

712
00:40:01,902 --> 00:40:03,233
We probably...

713
00:40:03,251 --> 00:40:05,669
- We might have to evacuate.
- ...shouldn't ignore that.

714
00:40:05,703 --> 00:40:07,621
I don't know.

715
00:40:07,672 --> 00:40:09,539
- You think...
- Long as it's not continuous.

716
00:40:09,590 --> 00:40:11,508
It's not continuous.

717
00:40:11,542 --> 00:40:15,178
No, I'm just saying,
if it... if it continues.

718
00:40:17,451 --> 00:40:19,766
And then we go, and we meet
the guys down in the lobby?

719
00:40:19,801 --> 00:40:23,053
- Yeah, right?
- Yeah.

720
00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,222
Yeah, let's, uh, let's just...
let's leave it for now.

721
00:40:25,256 --> 00:40:27,808
Let me, uh, finish this up.

722
00:40:30,226 --> 00:40:31,376
All right.

723
00:40:40,595 --> 00:40:41,872
Not that they're gonna
answer, 'cause they

724
00:40:41,906 --> 00:40:44,407
- probably got, like, 7,000 calls.
- Yeah.

725
00:40:46,962 --> 00:40:49,880
Hi, uh, we hear a loud
buzzing on the 10th floor.

726
00:40:49,912 --> 00:40:52,046
Can you tell us what that is?

727
00:40:54,001 --> 00:40:55,385
Oh, okay.

728
00:40:55,552 --> 00:40:57,854
Okay, great. Thank you. Bye.

729
00:40:59,173 --> 00:41:00,640
Fire alarm testing maintenance.

730
00:41:00,675 --> 00:41:01,975
- That's good.
- Yeah, yeah.

731
00:41:02,009 --> 00:41:03,209
That's what we wanted to hear.

732
00:41:03,227 --> 00:41:05,695
Nice of them to, uh...

733
00:41:05,719 --> 00:41:09,341
Nice of them to let us know
about that in advance.

734
00:41:11,519 --> 00:41:14,988
Um... I just wanted to give
you kind of a quick tour.

735
00:41:15,022 --> 00:41:17,490
Uh, when Laura was looking at
this, she was kind of salivating

736
00:41:17,525 --> 00:41:20,143
and couldn't stop, like, actually
reading the documents...

737
00:41:20,161 --> 00:41:22,195
- Right, right, so we'll try and restrain ourselves...
- Yeah.

738
00:41:22,246 --> 00:41:23,601
...without promising
that we'll succeed.

739
00:41:23,616 --> 00:41:25,332
Yeah, I just wanted
to kind of explain,

740
00:41:25,366 --> 00:41:28,976
a... a brief overview of what these
are and how they're organized.

741
00:41:29,046 --> 00:41:30,837
Um, the beginning are just
some documents of interest.

742
00:41:30,872 --> 00:41:35,438
Uh, the primary purpose of the second
archive is to bring the focus over to SSO,

743
00:41:35,485 --> 00:41:38,378
as opposed to, uh, PRISM,
and this is in general,

744
00:41:38,429 --> 00:41:41,014
uh, it's... SSO are the
Special Source Operations.

745
00:41:41,048 --> 00:41:45,552
Those are the worldwide passive
collection on networks.

746
00:41:45,603 --> 00:41:47,710
They're both domestic
to the U.S.

747
00:41:47,756 --> 00:41:49,444
and international.

748
00:41:49,506 --> 00:41:51,107
There's a lot of different
ways they do it...

749
00:41:51,142 --> 00:41:53,059
but, uh, corporate partnerships

750
00:41:53,110 --> 00:41:55,395
are one of the primary things,
uh, they do domestically.

751
00:41:55,446 --> 00:41:57,446
They also do this with
multinationals that might be

752
00:41:57,448 --> 00:41:59,449
headquartered in the U.S.
who they can kind of coerce

753
00:41:59,483 --> 00:42:01,952
and just pay into
giving them access,

754
00:42:01,986 --> 00:42:03,453
and they also do it bilaterally

755
00:42:03,487 --> 00:42:05,455
with the assistance
of certain governments.

756
00:42:05,489 --> 00:42:07,624
And that's basically on
the premise that they go,

757
00:42:07,658 --> 00:42:09,459
"All right, we'll help you
set this system up

758
00:42:09,493 --> 00:42:11,127
"if you give us all
the data from it."

759
00:42:11,162 --> 00:42:12,712
Um, so yeah.

760
00:42:12,747 --> 00:42:15,382
There's... there's...

761
00:42:15,416 --> 00:42:17,700
there's a lot more in here
than any one person

762
00:42:17,718 --> 00:42:19,886
- or probably one team could do.
- Right.

763
00:42:19,921 --> 00:42:21,871
Um, XKeyscore Deep-Dive,

764
00:42:21,889 --> 00:42:25,541
uh, XKeyscore in general...
and there's a huge folder

765
00:42:25,559 --> 00:42:28,468
of documentation on XKeyscore
and how it works...

766
00:42:28,499 --> 00:42:31,171
is the front-end system
that analysts use

767
00:42:31,226 --> 00:42:34,186
for querying that sort of ocean of raw
SIGINT that I was telling you about.

768
00:42:34,218 --> 00:42:37,720
All of that stuff where you can
sort of do the retroactive searches

769
00:42:37,738 --> 00:42:40,144
and live searches and get
flagging and whatnot,

770
00:42:40,246 --> 00:42:42,547
XKeyscore is
the front end for that.

771
00:42:44,264 --> 00:42:47,725
I'm just gonna show you one slide
here 'cause, uh, Laura thought

772
00:42:47,742 --> 00:42:50,741
it was valuable, and I was
talking about kind of how

773
00:42:50,771 --> 00:42:56,122
these, uh, capabilities ramp up
in sophistication over time.

774
00:42:56,446 --> 00:42:57,757
This is kinda nice.

775
00:42:57,792 --> 00:43:00,260
As of fiscal year 2011,
they could monitor

776
00:43:00,294 --> 00:43:03,513
1 billion telephone
or Internet sessions,

777
00:43:03,547 --> 00:43:06,664
simultaneously, per one
of these devices.

778
00:43:06,703 --> 00:43:12,242
And they could collect at the rate
of about 125 gigabytes a second,

779
00:43:12,281 --> 00:43:13,523
which is a terabit.

780
00:43:13,557 --> 00:43:15,358
That's just
each one of these devices.

781
00:43:15,393 --> 00:43:16,893
That's for each one
of these, yeah.

782
00:43:17,317 --> 00:43:19,529
How many TUMULT machines
would that be, then?

783
00:43:19,563 --> 00:43:22,899
Uh, per this, back then,
there were 20 sites.

784
00:43:22,950 --> 00:43:26,133
There's 10 at DOD installations,

785
00:43:26,170 --> 00:43:29,673
but these are all outdated;
we've expanded pretty rapidly.

786
00:43:30,441 --> 00:43:33,609
Uh, but still, 20 sites,
that's at least 20 billion.

787
00:43:33,627 --> 00:43:36,973
This all needs to get out, you
know what I mean? It's like...

788
00:43:36,999 --> 00:43:41,167
just in terms of understanding
the capabilities.

789
00:43:41,218 --> 00:43:42,635
Like, it's so opaque.

790
00:43:42,670 --> 00:43:44,287
It's not science fiction.

791
00:43:44,305 --> 00:43:46,473
- This stuff is happening right now.
- No, that's what I mean.

792
00:43:46,507 --> 00:43:48,458
It's like the...
the magnitude of it,

793
00:43:48,476 --> 00:43:52,731
and... and, like, this is a pretty
inaccessible technical document.

794
00:43:52,755 --> 00:43:55,315
- Yeah.
- But even this, like, is

795
00:43:55,349 --> 00:43:57,350
- really chilling, do you know what I mean?
- Yeah.

796
00:43:57,401 --> 00:44:00,153
And, yeah, I mean, we should have...
we should be having debates

797
00:44:00,187 --> 00:44:02,155
about whether we want
governments...

798
00:44:02,189 --> 00:44:04,832
I mean, this is massive
and extraordinary.

799
00:44:04,902 --> 00:44:06,659
- It's... it's amazing.
- Yeah.

800
00:44:06,694 --> 00:44:09,112
Even though you know it, you
know, even though you know that,

801
00:44:09,146 --> 00:44:12,648
- to see it, like, the physical blueprints of it...
- Mm-hmm.

802
00:44:12,666 --> 00:44:15,151
...and sort of the technical
expressions of it,

803
00:44:15,169 --> 00:44:19,739
brutally hits home in, like, a
super-visceral way that is so needed.

804
00:44:24,507 --> 00:44:27,115
<i>This is CNN Breaking News.</i>

805
00:44:27,185 --> 00:44:30,637
An explosive new report
is reigniting the concerns

806
00:44:30,685 --> 00:44:34,854
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's security.

807
00:44:34,889 --> 00:44:38,634
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency

808
00:44:38,673 --> 00:44:42,228
<i>blanket access to millions
of Verizon customers' records</i>

809
00:44:42,279 --> 00:44:43,696
<i>on a daily basis.</i>

810
00:44:43,731 --> 00:44:47,200
Earlier, I had the chance to conduct the
first TV interview with the reporter

811
00:44:47,234 --> 00:44:49,369
who broke this story wide open,

812
00:44:49,403 --> 00:44:51,871
Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian.

813
00:44:52,577 --> 00:44:53,907
<i>Congratulations on the scoop.</i>

814
00:44:53,958 --> 00:44:58,278
Explain for our viewers
why this is important.

815
00:44:58,312 --> 00:45:00,363
It's important because
people have understood

816
00:45:00,381 --> 00:45:03,193
that the law that this was done
under, which is the Patriot Act,

817
00:45:03,257 --> 00:45:05,185
enacted in the wake of 9/11...

818
00:45:05,209 --> 00:45:06,702
was a law that allowed
the government

819
00:45:06,720 --> 00:45:09,794
very broad powers to get
records about people

820
00:45:09,857 --> 00:45:12,542
with a lower level
of suspicion than

821
00:45:12,560 --> 00:45:14,394
probable cause, the
traditional standard.

822
00:45:14,428 --> 00:45:16,379
So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,

823
00:45:16,397 --> 00:45:18,548
if the government had
even any suspicion

824
00:45:18,566 --> 00:45:20,716
that you were involved
in a crime or terrorism,

825
00:45:20,734 --> 00:45:22,902
they could get a lot of
information about you.

826
00:45:22,937 --> 00:45:26,022
What this court order does
that makes it so striking is

827
00:45:26,056 --> 00:45:28,057
<i>that it's not directed
at any individuals</i>

828
00:45:28,075 --> 00:45:30,160
<i>who they believe
or have suspicion</i>

829
00:45:30,194 --> 00:45:33,029
of committing crimes or are part
of a terrorist organization.

830
00:45:33,219 --> 00:45:36,533
It's collecting the phone records
of every single customer

831
00:45:36,567 --> 00:45:40,703
of Verizon business and finding out
every single call that they've made,

832
00:45:40,737 --> 00:45:42,307
internationally and locally,

833
00:45:42,330 --> 00:45:44,207
so it's indiscriminate and it's sweeping.

834
00:45:44,241 --> 00:45:47,737
It's a government program designed to
collect information about all Americans,

835
00:45:47,783 --> 00:45:52,198
not just people where they believe there's
reason to think they've done anything wrong.

836
00:46:51,734 --> 00:46:54,644
Ah, it's... it's a tough
situation, you know,

837
00:46:54,662 --> 00:46:59,332
hearing that the person that you love,
that you've spent the decade with,

838
00:46:59,539 --> 00:47:01,951
may not be coming back.

839
00:47:06,190 --> 00:47:08,324
What did they ask her?

840
00:47:08,342 --> 00:47:11,327
Um, when was the
last time she saw me,

841
00:47:11,345 --> 00:47:14,330
where am I, um, what am I doing,

842
00:47:14,348 --> 00:47:17,350
you know, what does she
know about my illness,

843
00:47:17,384 --> 00:47:19,185
things like that.

844
00:47:19,220 --> 00:47:20,348
Hmm.

845
00:47:22,215 --> 00:47:24,840
So, yeah, they're, um,

846
00:47:24,858 --> 00:47:27,360
they're pretty solidly aware,

847
00:47:27,670 --> 00:47:29,397
'cause, uh...

848
00:47:29,902 --> 00:47:32,779
I'm clearly not at home, ill.

849
00:47:53,406 --> 00:47:55,138
- Hello?
- Hello?

850
00:47:55,172 --> 00:47:59,342
Hello. Let me disconnect
from the Internet.

851
00:48:02,009 --> 00:48:03,681
So...

852
00:48:04,290 --> 00:48:05,848
there's some news?

853
00:48:05,882 --> 00:48:07,556
Yes, there was indeed some news.

854
00:48:07,595 --> 00:48:10,806
I have config, today, I think,

855
00:48:10,853 --> 00:48:12,355
maybe just a few hours ago?

856
00:48:12,389 --> 00:48:15,908
What... what kind
of people visited?

857
00:48:15,943 --> 00:48:18,361
Uh... an HR lady,

858
00:48:18,395 --> 00:48:23,333
I'm assuming from NSA, as opposed
to, uh, as opposed to Booz Allen,

859
00:48:23,945 --> 00:48:25,554
because she was accompanied
by a police officer,

860
00:48:25,585 --> 00:48:27,509
- which means NSA police.
- Mmm.

861
00:48:27,540 --> 00:48:30,705
And they were planning to break into my
house, which regular police don't do.

862
00:48:30,708 --> 00:48:32,675
- Um...
- Does she live there?

863
00:48:32,710 --> 00:48:36,989
Yeah, she lives there, so I
told her to cooperate fully...

864
00:48:37,075 --> 00:48:38,595
I can't find my phone.
Just one second.

865
00:48:38,599 --> 00:48:39,716
You know, worry about herself.

866
00:48:39,750 --> 00:48:43,000
You know what I'm gonna do? I'll just
take out the stuff I want to use.

867
00:48:43,054 --> 00:48:44,270
Okay.

868
00:48:44,913 --> 00:48:46,756
Okay, well, look,
I mean, this is not

869
00:48:46,774 --> 00:48:48,758
- a surprising development.
- Nah, yeah, I know.

870
00:48:48,776 --> 00:48:51,277
I planned for it, but it's just...
you know, when it's impacting them

871
00:48:51,312 --> 00:48:53,313
and they're talking to you,
it's a little bit different.

872
00:48:53,364 --> 00:48:55,281
Absolutely.

873
00:48:55,995 --> 00:48:59,369
But it's possible that they just
noticed that you're missing.

874
00:48:59,403 --> 00:49:00,491
I guess it's not
really a possibility.

875
00:49:00,522 --> 00:49:03,608
It is, but, yeah,
they're... I mean...

876
00:49:07,776 --> 00:49:11,247
Um, let me just get rid of this.

877
00:49:13,117 --> 00:49:15,284
Sorry, I obviously was
focused on other things

878
00:49:15,302 --> 00:49:18,254
than appearance
this morning, so... ha!

879
00:49:18,741 --> 00:49:20,438
- Sorry.
- How was... how did she react?

880
00:49:20,477 --> 00:49:23,259
- Was she relatively calm about it?
- She's relatively calm...

881
00:49:23,293 --> 00:49:25,480
Does she know anything about what
you're doing and why?

882
00:49:25,519 --> 00:49:29,131
She has... she has no idea, um,
and that's... I mean,

883
00:49:29,149 --> 00:49:31,968
I... I feel badly about that,

884
00:49:32,002 --> 00:49:33,969
but that's the only way
I could think of where,

885
00:49:33,987 --> 00:49:35,938
like, she can't be in trouble.

886
00:49:35,972 --> 00:49:38,100
Did you just basically do a "I
have to go somewhere for reasons

887
00:49:38,123 --> 00:49:39,363
"that I can't tell you about"
kind of thing...

888
00:49:39,409 --> 00:49:42,151
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation.

889
00:49:42,339 --> 00:49:45,147
Um, and I... I left
a note saying, "Hey,

890
00:49:45,165 --> 00:49:47,200
"I'm going to be gone
for a while for work,"

891
00:49:47,251 --> 00:49:49,168
- which isn't unusual for me in my business...
- Right.

892
00:49:49,203 --> 00:49:51,120
...you know, so...

893
00:49:51,154 --> 00:49:53,821
Okay, so let me ask you a
couple things just quickly.

894
00:49:53,852 --> 00:49:55,675
Are they gonna be able
to go into your stuff

895
00:49:55,709 --> 00:49:57,460
and figure out what you took?

896
00:49:57,494 --> 00:49:59,796
Um...

897
00:50:00,642 --> 00:50:04,133
in... in some kind of,
some sort of, like,

898
00:50:04,167 --> 00:50:05,768
peripheral senses,
but not necessarily...

899
00:50:05,803 --> 00:50:07,770
- Not with great specificity...
- Yes.

900
00:50:07,805 --> 00:50:11,774
Uh, because I cast such a wide net,
if they do that, the only thing

901
00:50:11,809 --> 00:50:13,860
they're gonna do is they're gonna have a
heart attack 'cause they're gonna go,

902
00:50:13,894 --> 00:50:15,778
- "He had access to everything..."
- Yeah.

903
00:50:15,813 --> 00:50:19,282
And they're not gonna know what
specifically has been done.

904
00:50:19,316 --> 00:50:22,285
Now, I think they're gonna start
to actually feel a little better,

905
00:50:22,319 --> 00:50:26,682
although they're not gonna be,
uh, wild about this in any case,

906
00:50:26,744 --> 00:50:29,792
when they see that the stories
are kind of cleaving to a trend.

907
00:50:29,827 --> 00:50:33,246
You know, it's not like, "Here's the
list of everybody who works everywhere."

908
00:50:33,297 --> 00:50:36,249
Right. I also think, you know,
they're gonna be paranoid

909
00:50:36,300 --> 00:50:40,908
in the extreme and assuming all
kinds of worst-case scenarios,

910
00:50:40,939 --> 00:50:43,619
which is gonna, you know,
I think, make them

911
00:50:43,689 --> 00:50:48,978
react in ways that probably aren't, like,
gonna be particularly rational on their part.

912
00:50:49,012 --> 00:50:51,481
But, at the same time,
there's...

913
00:50:51,515 --> 00:50:53,983
I do think they're limited
for the moment.

914
00:50:54,017 --> 00:50:56,936
I... I agree, and I mean,
I had kind of time

915
00:50:56,987 --> 00:51:00,940
to set a stage where... we all enjoy at
least a minimum level of protection,

916
00:51:00,991 --> 00:51:02,942
you know, no matter who we
are, who's involved in this.

917
00:51:02,993 --> 00:51:04,610
- You know, you're either a journalist...
- Right.

918
00:51:04,661 --> 00:51:06,061
...or you're either out
of jurisdiction,

919
00:51:06,079 --> 00:51:09,064
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.

920
00:51:09,082 --> 00:51:11,066
I think it's over, you know, the
weeks, when they have times

921
00:51:11,084 --> 00:51:15,087
to get lawyers, really sort of go,
"This is a special situation.

922
00:51:15,122 --> 00:51:17,072
"How can we interpret this
to our advantage?"

923
00:51:17,090 --> 00:51:19,175
Like, we... we see them do
this all the time, you know,

924
00:51:19,209 --> 00:51:21,577
whether it's drones
or wiretapping or whatever.

925
00:51:21,595 --> 00:51:25,080
They'll go, "Well, according
to this law from the 1840s,

926
00:51:25,098 --> 00:51:27,583
- "you know, we have X, Y, or Z authority."
- Mm-hmm.

927
00:51:27,601 --> 00:51:30,085
But that... that takes time, and
that takes a great deal of effort.

928
00:51:30,103 --> 00:51:32,922
Yeah, and also, you know, I
mean, I think the more public

929
00:51:32,940 --> 00:51:35,580
we are out there, too,
like, as journalists, and

930
00:51:35,636 --> 00:51:38,838
the more protection that's
gonna give it as well.

931
00:51:38,932 --> 00:51:42,401
Have you started to give thought to
when you're ready to come forward?

932
00:51:42,472 --> 00:51:45,284
I'm... I'm ready whenever, um,

933
00:51:45,319 --> 00:51:48,287
honestly, I think there's
sort of an agreement

934
00:51:48,322 --> 00:51:51,123
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.

935
00:51:51,158 --> 00:51:52,608
That's my primary
concern at this point.

936
00:51:52,626 --> 00:51:55,127
I don't want to get
myself into the issue

937
00:51:55,162 --> 00:51:57,613
before it's gonna happen anyway,
and where it takes away

938
00:51:57,631 --> 00:51:59,298
from the stories
that are getting out.

939
00:52:37,938 --> 00:52:41,591
<i>We're talking about tens
of millions of Americans,</i>

940
00:52:41,625 --> 00:52:43,759
<i>who weren't suspected
of doing anything,</i>

941
00:52:43,794 --> 00:52:45,494
<i>who were surveilled in this way.</i>

942
00:52:45,529 --> 00:52:46,662
<i>Hold your thoughts for a moment.</i>

943
00:52:46,697 --> 00:52:47,997
<i>I want to continue
this conversation</i>

944
00:52:48,031 --> 00:52:50,146
<i>because these are really
important, sensitive issues,</i>

945
00:52:50,193 --> 00:52:52,969
<i>and the public out there has
a right to know what's going on.</i>

946
00:52:53,003 --> 00:52:56,763
<i>- Stand by...
- This is CNN Breaking News.</i>

947
00:52:56,841 --> 00:52:59,174
Well, another explosive
article has just appeared,

948
00:52:59,192 --> 00:53:01,176
this time in
the Washington Post.

949
00:53:01,194 --> 00:53:03,748
It's breaking news, and it
reveals another

950
00:53:03,779 --> 00:53:06,832
broad and secret U.S. government
surveillance program.

951
00:53:06,867 --> 00:53:09,652
The Washington Post
and the Guardian in London

952
00:53:09,686 --> 00:53:13,355
reporting that the NSA
and the FBI are tapping directly

953
00:53:13,373 --> 00:53:17,359
into the central servers
of 9 leading Internet companies,

954
00:53:17,377 --> 00:53:20,212
including Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook,

955
00:53:20,247 --> 00:53:23,215
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.

956
00:53:23,250 --> 00:53:26,201
The Post says they're
extracting audio, video,

957
00:53:26,219 --> 00:53:29,705
photographs, emails,
documents, and connection logs

958
00:53:29,723 --> 00:53:32,391
that enable analysts
to track a person's movements

959
00:53:32,426 --> 00:53:34,710
and contacts over time.

960
00:53:34,728 --> 00:53:36,929
Let's discuss
this latest revelation.

961
00:53:36,980 --> 00:53:38,397
They're coming out fast.

962
00:53:38,432 --> 00:53:40,600
Uh, Bill Binney, the former
official of the NSA

963
00:53:40,651 --> 00:53:42,568
who quit back in 2001.

964
00:53:42,603 --> 00:53:44,570
You were angry
over what was going on.

965
00:53:44,605 --> 00:53:46,756
You're known as
a whistleblower right now.

966
00:53:46,790 --> 00:53:48,858
Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?

967
00:53:48,892 --> 00:53:50,910
Well, I assume it's
just a continuation

968
00:53:50,944 --> 00:53:52,561
of what they've been
doing all along.

969
00:53:52,579 --> 00:53:54,063
- So you're not surprised.
- No.

970
00:53:54,081 --> 00:53:56,448
Do you have any idea who's
leaking this information?

971
00:53:56,487 --> 00:53:58,495
I don't know who leaked this.

972
00:53:58,533 --> 00:54:00,503
I have no doubt that
the administration

973
00:54:00,570 --> 00:54:02,538
will launch an investigation,

974
00:54:02,572 --> 00:54:04,722
not into who approved
these programs,

975
00:54:04,769 --> 00:54:06,709
but into who leaked
the information.

976
00:54:06,743 --> 00:54:09,544
<i>I am not shocked that the
companies are denying it.</i>

977
00:54:09,560 --> 00:54:11,695
<i>- I don't assume...
- Do you believe them?</i>

978
00:54:11,732 --> 00:54:14,083
<i>There may be some technical
basis on which they can say</i>

979
00:54:14,101 --> 00:54:16,752
<i>that "we are not
actively collaborating"</i>

980
00:54:16,770 --> 00:54:18,950
<i>or "they don't have
what we consider</i>

981
00:54:18,997 --> 00:54:21,691
<i>"in our own definition to be
direct access to our servers,"</i>

982
00:54:21,725 --> 00:54:25,340
<i>but what I do know is I have
talked to more than one person</i>

983
00:54:25,387 --> 00:54:28,872
<i>who has sat at a desk
at a web portal</i>

984
00:54:28,896 --> 00:54:33,452
<i>and typed out commands and reached
into those servers from a distance.</i>

985
00:54:33,487 --> 00:54:36,238
<i>So whatever they want to call
that, that's what's happening.</i>

986
00:54:36,272 --> 00:54:38,941
<i>Well, what I would call it is
the single-biggest infringement</i>

987
00:54:38,959 --> 00:54:42,411
<i>on American civil liberties
probably of all time, isn't it?</i>

988
00:54:42,445 --> 00:54:44,413
<i>And this story... you have the
New York Times now today</i>

989
00:54:44,447 --> 00:54:46,882
<i>saying that the administration
has lost all credibility.</i>

990
00:54:46,917 --> 00:54:49,202
<i>Yeah, the New York Times slammed
President Obama for this</i>

991
00:54:49,256 --> 00:54:50,386
<i>and frankly I was used to that.</i>

992
00:54:50,420 --> 00:54:52,054
<i>The New York Times used
to slam George Bush</i>

993
00:54:52,089 --> 00:54:54,256
<i>for protecting the country
and for the steps he took.</i>

994
00:54:54,290 --> 00:54:55,624
<i>I don't want us
to drop our guard.</i>

995
00:54:55,642 --> 00:54:57,126
<i>I don't want us
to be struck again.</i>

996
00:54:57,144 --> 00:54:59,178
<i>As we saw in Boston, Anderson,</i>

997
00:54:59,229 --> 00:55:02,064
<i>people are willing to sacrifice
their civil liberties.</i>

998
00:55:02,099 --> 00:55:03,683
<i>People sheltered
inside because...</i>

999
00:55:03,734 --> 00:55:05,401
<i>How can you believe in
freedom, do you think...</i>

1000
00:55:05,435 --> 00:55:07,403
<i>I mean, try and play
devil's advocate for me...</i>

1001
00:55:07,437 --> 00:55:09,238
<i>when you have secret courts,</i>

1002
00:55:09,272 --> 00:55:11,240
<i>secret operations like PRISM,</i>

1003
00:55:11,274 --> 00:55:13,242
<i>secret investigations
which go into</i>

1004
00:55:13,276 --> 00:55:16,028
<i>every spit and cough
of every American's lives,</i>

1005
00:55:16,079 --> 00:55:18,581
<i>without any member of the
American public knowing about it?</i>

1006
00:55:18,615 --> 00:55:20,583
<i>- That's not freedom, is it?
- In 2008,</i>

1007
00:55:20,617 --> 00:55:22,918
<i>they eliminated
the warrant requirement</i>

1008
00:55:22,953 --> 00:55:27,469
<i>for all conversations except ones that
take place by and among Americans</i>

1009
00:55:27,493 --> 00:55:29,258
<i>exclusively on American soil.</i>

1010
00:55:29,292 --> 00:55:31,761
<i>So they don't need
warrants now for people</i>

1011
00:55:31,795 --> 00:55:33,500
<i>who are foreigners
outside of the U.S.,</i>

1012
00:55:33,539 --> 00:55:36,298
<i>but they also don't need
warrants for Americans</i>

1013
00:55:36,332 --> 00:55:38,601
<i>who are in the United States,
communicating with people</i>

1014
00:55:38,635 --> 00:55:40,936
<i>reasonably believed to
be outside of the U.S.</i>

1015
00:55:40,971 --> 00:55:43,139
<i>So again, the fact that
there are no checks,</i>

1016
00:55:43,173 --> 00:55:45,941
<i>no oversight about who's looking
over the NSA's shoulder,</i>

1017
00:55:45,976 --> 00:55:47,727
<i>means that they can take
whatever they want.</i>

1018
00:55:47,778 --> 00:55:49,945
<i>And the fact that it's all
behind a wall of secrecy</i>

1019
00:55:49,980 --> 00:55:52,281
<i>and they threaten people
who want to expose it,</i>

1020
00:55:52,315 --> 00:55:54,283
<i>means that whatever
they're doing,</i>

1021
00:55:54,317 --> 00:55:58,120
<i>even violating the law, is something that
we're unlikely to know until we start having</i>

1022
00:55:58,155 --> 00:56:02,959
<i>real investigations and real transparency
into what it is that the government is doing.</i>

1023
00:56:02,998 --> 00:56:06,712
<i>Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal.</i>

1024
00:56:06,747 --> 00:56:08,831
<i>I appreciate you joining me.</i>

1025
00:56:54,601 --> 00:56:57,847
Hey, I just, uh, heard
from Lindsay

1026
00:56:57,881 --> 00:57:01,967
and, uh, she's still alive,
which is good, and... and free.

1027
00:57:02,018 --> 00:57:06,605
My rent checks apparently are no
longer getting through to my landlord,

1028
00:57:06,640 --> 00:57:10,025
uh, so they said if we
don't pay them in 5 days,

1029
00:57:10,060 --> 00:57:12,216
we'll be evicted, which is strange,

1030
00:57:12,239 --> 00:57:15,981
because I've got a system set up
that automatically pays them.

1031
00:57:16,688 --> 00:57:20,486
Uh... so there's that, and apparently
there's construction trucks

1032
00:57:20,537 --> 00:57:25,207
all over the street of my house,
so that's, uh...

1033
00:57:27,099 --> 00:57:29,234
I wonder what they're looking for.

1034
00:58:10,101 --> 00:58:12,052
Heh!

1035
00:58:12,328 --> 00:58:15,624
It is, uh... it is
an unusual feeling

1036
00:58:15,658 --> 00:58:18,827
that's kind of hard to...
hard to, like, describe

1037
00:58:18,845 --> 00:58:21,630
or... or convey in words,

1038
00:58:21,664 --> 00:58:23,632
but not knowing
what's going to happen

1039
00:58:23,666 --> 00:58:26,802
the next day, the next
hour, the next week,

1040
00:58:26,836 --> 00:58:29,471
it's scary, but at the same time
it's liberating, you know?

1041
00:58:29,505 --> 00:58:32,808
The, uh... the planning
comes a lot easier

1042
00:58:32,842 --> 00:58:35,348
because you don't have that many
variables to take into play.

1043
00:58:35,387 --> 00:58:38,856
You can only... act
and then act again.

1044
00:58:39,191 --> 00:58:41,768
<i>Now all these phone calls are
being recorded digitally,</i>

1045
00:58:41,799 --> 00:58:44,686
<i>not for content, but for
origin and destination.</i>

1046
00:58:44,704 --> 00:58:47,022
<i>Now word the government is
going right into the servers</i>

1047
00:58:47,040 --> 00:58:48,958
<i>of these large
Internet companies.</i>

1048
00:58:48,992 --> 00:58:51,627
<i>How does the government,
politically speaking,</i>

1049
00:58:51,661 --> 00:58:53,796
<i>make the argument
that this is essential</i>

1050
00:58:53,830 --> 00:58:57,001
<i>to national security and not
a dramatic overreach</i>

1051
00:58:57,033 --> 00:58:59,306
<i>in terms of personal privacy?</i>

1052
00:58:59,361 --> 00:59:01,703
It's difficult, Matt, because,
as Peter was pointing out,

1053
00:59:01,721 --> 00:59:04,539
overnight we had an
extraordinary late-night,

1054
00:59:04,557 --> 00:59:07,559
close-to-midnight announcement
and a declassification

1055
00:59:07,594 --> 00:59:09,274
from the Director of
National Intelligence.

1056
00:59:09,312 --> 00:59:10,562
They are scrambling.

1057
00:59:10,597 --> 00:59:14,183
The administration's already supported
strongly by leaders in both parties

1058
00:59:14,217 --> 00:59:15,684
<i>from the intelligence
committees.</i>

1059
00:59:15,718 --> 00:59:18,593
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia,

1060
00:59:18,639 --> 00:59:21,576
at the top-secret, you know,
super-classified level...

1061
00:59:21,631 --> 00:59:23,358
- Yeah.
- ...where anybody working intelligence

1062
00:59:23,393 --> 00:59:25,160
can work on anything they want.

1063
00:59:25,195 --> 00:59:26,946
- Yeah.
- That's what this is. I'm giving it to you.

1064
00:59:26,997 --> 00:59:29,665
You can make the decisions on that:
what's appropriate, what's not.

1065
00:59:29,699 --> 00:59:32,105
Um, it's going to be documents
of, you know, different types:

1066
00:59:32,152 --> 00:59:35,395
pictures and PowerPoints and
Word documents, stuff like that.

1067
00:59:35,422 --> 00:59:37,122
- Um...
- Sorry. Can I take that seat?

1068
00:59:37,173 --> 00:59:38,757
Yeah.

1069
00:59:40,126 --> 00:59:42,011
I'm sorry.
I'll get you to repeat.

1070
00:59:42,045 --> 00:59:44,670
So, in these documents,
they all show...

1071
00:59:44,732 --> 00:59:46,465
Yeah, there'll be a couple
more documents on that.

1072
00:59:46,516 --> 00:59:49,468
That's only one part, though;
like, it talks about Tempora

1073
00:59:49,519 --> 00:59:52,604
and a little more thing, that's
the Wiki article itself.

1074
00:59:52,639 --> 00:59:55,057
It was also talking about
a self-developed tool

1075
00:59:55,091 --> 00:59:58,254
called UDAQ, U-D-A-Q.

1076
00:59:58,308 --> 01:00:02,311
It's their search tool for all the stuff
they collect, was what it looked like.

1077
01:00:02,387 --> 01:00:03,983
- Yeah.
- It's going to be projects,

1078
01:00:04,034 --> 01:00:07,436
it's going to be troubleshooting
pages for a particular tool...

1079
01:00:07,454 --> 01:00:10,439
Thanks. And what's
the next step?

1080
01:00:10,457 --> 01:00:12,607
When do you think
you'll go public, uh...

1081
01:00:12,625 --> 01:00:14,943
Ah... I think it's pretty soon.

1082
01:00:14,961 --> 01:00:17,713
I mean, with the reaction,
this escalated more quickly.

1083
01:00:17,747 --> 01:00:20,187
I think, pretty much as soon as
they start trying to make this

1084
01:00:20,216 --> 01:00:23,635
- about me, which should be any day now...
- Yeah.

1085
01:00:23,670 --> 01:00:25,971
Um, I'll... I'll
come out just to go,

1086
01:00:26,006 --> 01:00:28,239
"Hey, you know, this is, uh,

1087
01:00:28,302 --> 01:00:31,575
"this is not a question of somebody
skulking around in the shadows."

1088
01:00:31,606 --> 01:00:33,062
- Yeah.
- "These are public issues.

1089
01:00:33,096 --> 01:00:34,528
"These are not
my issues, you know.

1090
01:00:34,591 --> 01:00:37,933
"These are everybody's issues,
and I'm not afraid of you.

1091
01:00:37,967 --> 01:00:40,235
"You know, you're not going
to bully me into silence

1092
01:00:40,270 --> 01:00:42,321
"like you've done
to everybody else.

1093
01:00:42,355 --> 01:00:45,042
"And if nobody else is
gonna do it, I will,

1094
01:00:45,097 --> 01:00:47,526
"and hopefully when I'm gone,
whatever you do to me,

1095
01:00:47,577 --> 01:00:49,737
"there will be somebody else
who'll do the same thing."

1096
01:00:49,746 --> 01:00:52,865
It'll be the sort of Internet
principle of the hydra;

1097
01:00:52,916 --> 01:00:56,452
you know, "you can stomp one person,
but there's gonna be 7 more of us."

1098
01:00:56,735 --> 01:00:57,714
Yeah.

1099
01:01:00,507 --> 01:01:02,458
Uh, are you
getting more nervous?

1100
01:01:02,835 --> 01:01:06,337
Um... I mean...

1101
01:01:06,382 --> 01:01:07,162
no.

1102
01:01:07,180 --> 01:01:08,630
I... I think, uh,

1103
01:01:08,664 --> 01:01:11,300
I think the way
I look at stress,

1104
01:01:11,334 --> 01:01:14,269
particularly because I
sort of knew this was coming,

1105
01:01:14,304 --> 01:01:18,507
you know, because I sort of
volunteered to walk into it,

1106
01:01:18,685 --> 01:01:21,009
um...

1107
01:01:21,378 --> 01:01:23,941
I... I'm already sort of...

1108
01:01:24,378 --> 01:01:25,940
familiar with the idea.

1109
01:01:25,995 --> 01:01:29,131
I'm not worried about it. When
somebody, like, busts in the door,

1110
01:01:29,166 --> 01:01:31,019
- suddenly I'll get nervous and it'll affect me.
- Yeah.

1111
01:01:31,037 --> 01:01:34,289
But until they do...
I... I... um, you know.

1112
01:01:34,529 --> 01:01:36,291
I'm eating a little less;
that's the only...

1113
01:01:36,326 --> 01:01:38,811
only difference, I think.

1114
01:01:44,209 --> 01:01:48,137
Let's talk about the issue with
when we're gonna say who you are.

1115
01:01:48,171 --> 01:01:50,806
- Yeah.
- This is... you know,

1116
01:01:50,840 --> 01:01:52,808
- you have to talk me through this...
- Mm-hmm.

1117
01:01:52,842 --> 01:01:54,977
...because I have a big
worry about this...

1118
01:01:55,011 --> 01:01:57,513
- Okay, tell me.
- ...which is that

1119
01:01:57,702 --> 01:02:00,137
if we come out and...

1120
01:02:00,492 --> 01:02:03,242
I know that you believe
that your...

1121
01:02:03,320 --> 01:02:05,187
- detection is inevitable...
- Uh-huh.

1122
01:02:05,238 --> 01:02:07,390
...and that it's
inevitable imminently.

1123
01:02:07,421 --> 01:02:08,607
There's, you know,
in the New York Times

1124
01:02:08,658 --> 01:02:11,493
today, Charlie Savage, the
fascinating Sherlock Holmes

1125
01:02:11,528 --> 01:02:14,696
of political reporting,
deduced that the fact

1126
01:02:14,730 --> 01:02:17,282
that there has been these leaks in
succession probably means that there's

1127
01:02:17,349 --> 01:02:19,069
some one person who's decided
to leak a bunch of stuff...

1128
01:02:19,100 --> 01:02:21,889
Somebody else quoted
you as saying it was one of your readers.

1129
01:02:21,926 --> 01:02:22,358
Yeah.

1130
01:02:22,397 --> 01:02:24,623
- And somebody else who put another thing, yeah...
- Yeah, so, you know, we're...

1131
01:02:24,674 --> 01:02:27,624
I mean, it's fine. I want people to...
I want it to be,

1132
01:02:27,663 --> 01:02:28,670
- you know, like...
- Yeah, yeah, yeah.

1133
01:02:28,711 --> 01:02:29,895
...you know, like,
this is a person.

1134
01:02:29,919 --> 01:02:31,746
I want to start
introducing the concept

1135
01:02:31,764 --> 01:02:34,427
that this is a person
who has a particular set

1136
01:02:34,466 --> 01:02:36,418
of political objectives
about informing

1137
01:02:36,436 --> 01:02:38,587
the world about what's taking
place, like, you know, so...

1138
01:02:38,605 --> 01:02:40,772
- Mm-hmm.
- I'm keeping it all anonymous,

1139
01:02:40,807 --> 01:02:43,730
totally, but I want
to start introducing you

1140
01:02:43,784 --> 01:02:45,611
in that kind of incremental way,

1141
01:02:45,645 --> 01:02:47,551
but here's the thing.

1142
01:02:47,621 --> 01:02:50,732
What I am concerned about is
that if we come out and say,

1143
01:02:50,766 --> 01:02:52,901
"Here's who this is, here's
what he did," the whole thing

1144
01:02:52,935 --> 01:02:55,404
that we talked about, that
we're gonna basically be doing

1145
01:02:55,438 --> 01:02:57,606
the government's work for them,
and we're gonna basically be

1146
01:02:57,624 --> 01:03:00,975
handing them,
you know, a confession,

1147
01:03:01,022 --> 01:03:03,912
um, and helping them
identify who found it.

1148
01:03:03,946 --> 01:03:06,946
I mean, maybe you're right, maybe
they'll... maybe they'll find out quickly,

1149
01:03:06,949 --> 01:03:09,751
and maybe they'll know, but is there
any possibility that they won't?

1150
01:03:09,785 --> 01:03:14,688
Are we... are we kind of giving them
stuff that we don't... or... or... or...

1151
01:03:14,766 --> 01:03:16,458
The possibility that they
know, but they don't want

1152
01:03:16,476 --> 01:03:17,996
to reveal it because
they don't know...

1153
01:03:18,011 --> 01:03:19,794
Or that they don't know, and
we're going to be telling them.

1154
01:03:19,812 --> 01:03:21,796
Like, is it a possibility
that they're going to need,

1155
01:03:21,814 --> 01:03:24,316
like, 2, 3 months of
uncertainty, and we're going

1156
01:03:24,350 --> 01:03:25,984
to be solving
that problem for them?

1157
01:03:26,019 --> 01:03:28,470
Or... let me just say
the "or" part...

1158
01:03:28,488 --> 01:03:30,989
maybe it doesn't matter to
you, like, maybe you want it.

1159
01:03:31,024 --> 01:03:33,659
Maybe... maybe... I mean,
you're not coming out

1160
01:03:33,693 --> 01:03:36,445
because you think
inevitably they're going

1161
01:03:36,479 --> 01:03:38,497
to catch you, and you
want to do it first.

1162
01:03:38,531 --> 01:03:40,815
You're coming out because
you want to fucking come out

1163
01:03:40,833 --> 01:03:43,001
- and you want to be heard.
- Oh, there is that. I mean, that's the thing.

1164
01:03:43,036 --> 01:03:45,504
I... I don't want to hide
on this and skulk around.

1165
01:03:45,538 --> 01:03:46,988
I don't think I should have to.

1166
01:03:47,006 --> 01:03:49,675
Um, obviously there are
circumstances that are saying that.

1167
01:03:49,709 --> 01:03:52,494
I think it is powerful
to come out and be like,

1168
01:03:52,512 --> 01:03:56,331
"Look, I'm not afraid, you know, and I
don't think other people should, either.

1169
01:03:56,349 --> 01:03:59,334
"You know, I was sitting in the
office right next to you last week.

1170
01:03:59,352 --> 01:04:02,337
"You know, we all have a stake
in this, this is our country,

1171
01:04:02,355 --> 01:04:06,358
"and the balance of power between
the citizenry and the government

1172
01:04:06,392 --> 01:04:09,344
"is becoming that of
the ruling and the ruled,

1173
01:04:09,362 --> 01:04:12,847
"as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate."

1174
01:04:12,865 --> 01:04:17,574
Okay, so that's what I need to
hear, that this is not about...

1175
01:04:17,637 --> 01:04:20,689
But I... I do want to say
I don't think there's a case

1176
01:04:20,707 --> 01:04:24,025
that I'm not going to be discovered
in the fullness of time.

1177
01:04:24,043 --> 01:04:26,027
It's a question of time frame.
You're right.

1178
01:04:26,045 --> 01:04:28,010
It could take them a long time...
I don't think it will...

1179
01:04:28,057 --> 01:04:30,699
but I... I didn't try to hide
the footprint because, again,

1180
01:04:30,717 --> 01:04:32,701
- I intended to come forward the whole time.
- Okay.

1181
01:04:32,719 --> 01:04:36,722
I'm going to post this morning just a
general defence of whistleblowers...

1182
01:04:36,756 --> 01:04:38,724
- That's fine, yeah.
- ...and you in particular

1183
01:04:38,758 --> 01:04:40,375
without saying
anything about you.

1184
01:04:40,393 --> 01:04:42,511
I'm gonna go post that right when
I get back, and I'm also doing,

1185
01:04:42,545 --> 01:04:44,179
like, a big "fuck you"
to all the people

1186
01:04:44,213 --> 01:04:45,814
who keep, like, talking
about investigations.

1187
01:04:45,848 --> 01:04:48,483
- Like, that... I want that to be, like...
- Yeah.

1188
01:04:48,518 --> 01:04:51,720
...the fearlessness and the "fuck
you" to, like, the bullying tactics

1189
01:04:51,738 --> 01:04:55,357
has got to be completely
pervading everything we do.

1190
01:04:55,391 --> 01:04:56,858
And I think that's brilliant.

1191
01:04:56,892 --> 01:04:58,860
I mean, your principles
on this I love,

1192
01:04:58,894 --> 01:05:01,997
I can't support them
enough, um, because it is.

1193
01:05:02,031 --> 01:05:05,000
It's inverting the model that
the government has laid out,

1194
01:05:05,034 --> 01:05:07,869
where people who are trying to, you
know, say the truth skulk around

1195
01:05:07,903 --> 01:05:10,339
and they hide in the dark and they
quote anonymously and whatnot.

1196
01:05:10,373 --> 01:05:12,040
- I say yes, fuck that.
- Okay.

1197
01:05:12,074 --> 01:05:14,574
- Let's just...
- So here's the plan then,

1198
01:05:14,620 --> 01:05:16,378
I mean, and this is
the thing. It's like...

1199
01:05:16,412 --> 01:05:18,185
once you... like, I think
we all just felt

1200
01:05:18,216 --> 01:05:20,382
- the fact that this is the right way to do it.
- Mm-hmm.

1201
01:05:20,416 --> 01:05:23,685
It's the... you feel the power of
your choice, you know what I mean?

1202
01:05:23,720 --> 01:05:26,188
It's like... and I want that
power to be felt in the world.

1203
01:05:26,222 --> 01:05:28,724
- Okay.
- And it is the bi... I mean, it's

1204
01:05:28,758 --> 01:05:30,726
the ultimate standing up
to them, right?

1205
01:05:30,760 --> 01:05:32,861
Like, "I'm not gonna
fucking hide

1206
01:05:32,895 --> 01:05:34,415
- "even for, like, one second."
- Yeah.

1207
01:05:34,430 --> 01:05:36,398
"I am gonna get
right in your face.

1208
01:05:36,432 --> 01:05:38,032
- Yeah.
- You don't have to investigate."

1209
01:05:38,142 --> 01:05:40,243
"There's nothing to
investigate. Here I am."

1210
01:05:40,269 --> 01:05:42,321
- Yeah.
- You know, and... and

1211
01:05:42,372 --> 01:05:44,239
I think that is just
incredibly powerful.

1212
01:05:44,273 --> 01:05:46,590
And then the question
just becomes

1213
01:05:46,645 --> 01:05:50,379
"How do we do this in the right, you know,
the perfect way", and that's my burden.

1214
01:05:50,413 --> 01:05:53,742
And that's what I'm gonna...
I... so today is gonna be

1215
01:05:53,765 --> 01:05:56,718
the story in the morning, assuming that
it doesn't change in the Guardian, then

1216
01:05:56,753 --> 01:05:58,920
it's gonna be the story in the morning,
just to keep the momentum going,

1217
01:05:58,954 --> 01:06:02,758
just to keep, like, the disclosures
coming, a big one at night.

1218
01:06:02,792 --> 01:06:05,560
Now it's becoming
like, "Okay, this is

1219
01:06:05,595 --> 01:06:07,295
- "a major leak."
- Mm-hmm.

1220
01:06:07,313 --> 01:06:09,314
And after today, when
we post the true stuff,

1221
01:06:09,349 --> 01:06:12,184
things that we're gonna
post, it's gonna be,

1222
01:06:12,430 --> 01:06:15,916
"What the fuck is this leak and
who did it?" I guarantee you.

1223
01:06:25,776 --> 01:06:28,283
I just want to make
sure... move over slightly.

1224
01:06:28,334 --> 01:06:30,335
Do you want me to move a
little more over, or... okay.

1225
01:06:30,370 --> 01:06:31,870
I just want to... all right.

1226
01:06:32,561 --> 01:06:34,339
Hmm.

1227
01:06:34,585 --> 01:06:36,324
All right, we're rolling.

1228
01:06:36,342 --> 01:06:38,844
So let's just begin with some
basic background information,

1229
01:06:38,878 --> 01:06:41,176
like, just state your name,

1230
01:06:41,231 --> 01:06:43,014
what position you held in
the intelligence community,

1231
01:06:43,049 --> 01:06:46,497
and... and how long you worked
within that community.

1232
01:06:46,622 --> 01:06:49,020
Okay, um, just so I'm aware
of where we're going,

1233
01:06:49,055 --> 01:06:51,306
how in-depth are we
going... just in general,

1234
01:06:51,340 --> 01:06:53,191
like, "I am currently an
infrastructure analyst,"

1235
01:06:53,226 --> 01:06:55,176
you know, Booz Allen Hamilton,

1236
01:06:55,194 --> 01:06:57,345
- not going through my whole back story?
- Yep.

1237
01:06:57,363 --> 01:06:59,457
- Okay.
- Just like, yeah, summary, kind of.

1238
01:06:59,519 --> 01:07:01,516
Okay. Uh, my name's Ed Snowden.

1239
01:07:01,534 --> 01:07:03,535
I am, uh, 29 years old.

1240
01:07:03,569 --> 01:07:05,987
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton

1241
01:07:06,021 --> 01:07:08,523
as an infrastructure
analyst for NSA,

1242
01:07:08,541 --> 01:07:10,992
uh, in Hawaii.

1243
01:07:11,026 --> 01:07:13,211
And what are some of
the positions that you held

1244
01:07:13,246 --> 01:07:15,163
previously within
the intelligence community?

1245
01:07:15,197 --> 01:07:17,649
Uh, I have been
a systems engineer,

1246
01:07:17,683 --> 01:07:20,368
a systems administrator, uh...

1247
01:07:20,386 --> 01:07:22,838
senior advisor, uh,

1248
01:07:22,872 --> 01:07:25,674
for the, uh, Central
Intelligence Agency,

1249
01:07:25,708 --> 01:07:28,376
solutions consultant, and a, uh,

1250
01:07:28,394 --> 01:07:31,313
telecommunications
information systems officer.

1251
01:07:31,347 --> 01:07:36,017
And what kind of clearances have... have
you held, what kind of classification?

1252
01:07:36,051 --> 01:07:40,188
Uh, Top Secret, uh... hmm.

1253
01:07:42,334 --> 01:07:46,895
So people in my levels of access for
systems administration or as a...

1254
01:07:46,913 --> 01:07:49,614
infrastructure analyst
typically have, uh,

1255
01:07:49,665 --> 01:07:54,002
higher accesses than an NSA
employee would normally have.

1256
01:07:54,036 --> 01:07:57,539
Uh, normal NSA employees have
a combination of clearances

1257
01:07:57,573 --> 01:08:01,713
called TS, SI, TK, and Gamma.

1258
01:08:01,744 --> 01:08:04,212
Um, that's, uh, Top Secret,

1259
01:08:04,246 --> 01:08:06,214
uh, Signals Intelligence,

1260
01:08:06,248 --> 01:08:07,883
Talent Keyhole, and Gamma.

1261
01:08:07,917 --> 01:08:09,885
And they all, uh, relate
to certain things

1262
01:08:09,919 --> 01:08:12,624
that are sort of core
to the NSA mission.

1263
01:08:12,717 --> 01:08:14,890
As a systems administrator,

1264
01:08:14,924 --> 01:08:16,892
you get a special
clearance called PRIVAC,

1265
01:08:16,926 --> 01:08:19,728
for Privileged Access,
which allows you to be

1266
01:08:19,762 --> 01:08:22,697
exposed to information
of any classification,

1267
01:08:22,732 --> 01:08:25,901
regardless of what your
position actually needs.

1268
01:09:00,601 --> 01:09:03,304
<i>Now, just before we go, a reminder
of our top story, and that's</i>

1269
01:09:03,322 --> 01:09:06,324
<i>that the former CIA
technical worker Edward Snowden</i>

1270
01:09:06,359 --> 01:09:09,578
<i>says he's responsible
for leaking information</i>

1271
01:09:09,612 --> 01:09:12,080
<i>that the U.S. authorities
had been monitoring</i>

1272
01:09:12,114 --> 01:09:14,482
<i>phone and Internet data.</i>

1273
01:09:14,500 --> 01:09:16,535
<i>The U.S. Justice Department
confirmed it's in</i>

1274
01:09:16,586 --> 01:09:19,788
<i>the first stages
of a criminal investigation.</i>

1275
01:09:19,822 --> 01:09:22,040
Leave it longer or cut it shorter?
What do you think?

1276
01:09:22,091 --> 01:09:24,486
As far as the video
that people saw?

1277
01:09:24,512 --> 01:09:25,791
- Am I less identifiable now?
- Lose it.

1278
01:09:25,817 --> 01:09:26,753
Lose it?

1279
01:09:27,183 --> 01:09:28,597
'Cause I can't go
all the way down.

1280
01:09:28,631 --> 01:09:29,762
It's still gonna be stubble.

1281
01:09:29,811 --> 01:09:31,779
I don't have
the blade for closer.

1282
01:09:34,381 --> 01:09:37,973
Will you be talking to any other
media about this story today?

1283
01:09:38,007 --> 01:09:39,441
I am.

1284
01:09:39,475 --> 01:09:41,393
Um, will you be coming
to our office?

1285
01:09:41,444 --> 01:09:43,478
Basically we'd be interested
to ask, of course, about where

1286
01:09:43,512 --> 01:09:44,896
is Snowden now,
what his plans are.

1287
01:09:44,947 --> 01:09:46,338
Well, I'm obviously not
going to talk about that...

1288
01:09:46,364 --> 01:09:47,630
- Okay.
- ...so unless you have any other questions,

1289
01:09:47,656 --> 01:09:50,358
- this is gonna be a pretty pointless interview.
- What are your plans, please?

1290
01:09:50,428 --> 01:09:52,153
Are you staying in Hong
Kong for the time being?

1291
01:09:52,187 --> 01:09:53,288
For a little while.

1292
01:09:53,322 --> 01:09:55,740
And do you have
any hopes to write more

1293
01:09:55,791 --> 01:09:58,743
about this story, or are you stopping
new writing about this story?

1294
01:09:58,794 --> 01:10:00,462
No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.

1295
01:10:00,496 --> 01:10:02,414
Have you had any pressure
from the U.S. authorities

1296
01:10:02,465 --> 01:10:05,422
- about continuing to report on this?
- No.

1297
01:10:05,485 --> 01:10:07,407
And have you heard
anything about what

1298
01:10:07,438 --> 01:10:10,305
could be the attitude of
Hong Kong authorities

1299
01:10:10,339 --> 01:10:12,307
towards this case, whether
they've contacted you

1300
01:10:12,341 --> 01:10:14,676
or asked you anything
about the whereabouts

1301
01:10:14,710 --> 01:10:16,928
of Snowden and whether
that is another...

1302
01:10:17,088 --> 01:10:20,482
I haven't heard from the
authorities of any government.

1303
01:10:21,088 --> 01:10:23,814
And where do you think
this story is going,

1304
01:10:23,838 --> 01:10:25,955
for you and,
of course, for Snowden,

1305
01:10:26,034 --> 01:10:29,608
and, of course, for the U.S. media and
the U.S. administration in general?

1306
01:10:29,659 --> 01:10:32,193
Well, for me, I can tell I'm
gonna continue to report on...

1307
01:10:32,227 --> 01:10:34,496
do my reporting on what
the government has been doing,

1308
01:10:34,530 --> 01:10:36,789
and what I think my readers
should know about.

1309
01:10:36,836 --> 01:10:38,917
Um, as for him, I don't
think anyone knows.

1310
01:10:38,951 --> 01:10:43,088
<i>They could have people come after me,
or any of their third-party partners.</i>

1311
01:10:43,122 --> 01:10:46,074
<i>You know, they work closely
with a number of other nations.</i>

1312
01:10:46,092 --> 01:10:48,793
<i>Or, you know, they could pay off
the triads or, you know,</i>

1313
01:10:48,844 --> 01:10:50,712
<i>any of their agents or assets.</i>

1314
01:10:50,746 --> 01:10:53,548
<i>Uh, we have a CIA station
just up the road,</i>

1315
01:10:53,582 --> 01:10:56,324
<i>at the consulate here
in Hong Kong.</i>

1316
01:11:21,711 --> 01:11:24,570
<i>Hello, I'm Daniela Ritorto.
The top story of this hour.</i>

1317
01:11:24,632 --> 01:11:26,715
<i>Facing a criminal investigation,</i>

1318
01:11:26,749 --> 01:11:29,584
<i>the whistleblower who revealed
details on how the U.S.</i>

1319
01:11:29,618 --> 01:11:33,555
<i>is monitoring phone calls
and Internet data goes public.</i>

1320
01:11:33,893 --> 01:11:36,624
<i>Security forces
in Afghanistan say a number</i>

1321
01:11:36,642 --> 01:11:40,595
<i>of Taliban insurgents
have targeted Kabul's airport.</i>

1322
01:11:40,629 --> 01:11:42,931
<i>Now it's time
for our newspaper review</i>

1323
01:11:42,982 --> 01:11:45,600
<i>and looking at what's making
headlines around the world.</i>

1324
01:11:45,634 --> 01:11:47,602
<i>Let's start with the Guardian,
our top story,</i>

1325
01:11:47,628 --> 01:11:51,864
<i>which is revealing the identity
of the former CIA employee</i>

1326
01:11:51,896 --> 01:11:54,860
<i>who the paper says leaked
information exposing the scale...</i>

1327
01:11:54,922 --> 01:11:58,063
- Shit.
<i>- of American surveillance of the Internet.</i>

1328
01:11:58,635 --> 01:11:59,914
<i>Edward Snowden.</i>

1329
01:11:59,938 --> 01:12:00,949
<i>What a great story.</i>

1330
01:12:00,983 --> 01:12:02,234
<i>Kira, Ewen, what do you think?</i>

1331
01:12:02,280 --> 01:12:04,169
<i>Well, I think it's
a fantastic story, first off.</i>

1332
01:12:04,203 --> 01:12:06,254
<i>It could be straight out
of a John le Carré novel.</i>

1333
01:12:06,288 --> 01:12:09,290
<i>I mean, when you read what he
did, yes, he got the material.</i>

1334
01:12:09,324 --> 01:12:12,460
<i>He then decided to go to the place he
identified as being very difficult...</i>

1335
01:12:12,494 --> 01:12:15,496
- Goddamn it.
<i>- ...for America to get at him, which is Hong Kong</i>

1336
01:12:15,514 --> 01:12:17,665
<i>because, of course,
technically inside China,</i>

1337
01:12:17,683 --> 01:12:20,835
<i>the one country-two systems
policy there, meaning</i>

1338
01:12:20,853 --> 01:12:24,139
<i>he would get potentially
some protection from it all.</i>

1339
01:12:24,173 --> 01:12:27,152
<i>All very well-planned; it could
have been just out of a spy novel.</i>

1340
01:12:27,200 --> 01:12:28,701
<i>But what about the details?</i>

1341
01:12:32,383 --> 01:12:35,110
Well, that could
make it worse, but...

1342
01:12:38,432 --> 01:12:39,143
I don't know.

1343
01:12:39,172 --> 01:12:41,974
Only shows the lower half
of my face.

1344
01:12:56,422 --> 01:12:59,424
<i>...every weekend,
here on BBC World News.</i>

1345
01:13:04,056 --> 01:13:06,147
<i>For in-depth,
on-the-point analysis</i>

1346
01:13:06,182 --> 01:13:08,650
<i>with a global perspective,
join me...</i>

1347
01:13:11,187 --> 01:13:14,572
<i>...only on BBC World News.</i>

1348
01:13:15,122 --> 01:13:17,575
<i>Snowden says he'd become
increasingly dismayed</i>

1349
01:13:17,610 --> 01:13:21,005
<i>by what he saw as
the growing power of the NSA,</i>

1350
01:13:21,036 --> 01:13:23,948
<i>hence his decision to pass on
documents which are said</i>

1351
01:13:23,999 --> 01:13:27,168
<i>to reveal not only that
the organization monitored</i>

1352
01:13:27,203 --> 01:13:31,172
<i>millions of phone calls, but that it
had direct access to some of the...</i>

1353
01:13:31,207 --> 01:13:33,607
- How do you feel?
<i>- biggest Internet companies in the world.</i>

1354
01:13:33,674 --> 01:13:36,961
Um... what happens happens.

1355
01:13:37,012 --> 01:13:40,515
We've, uh, we've talked about
this; I knew what the risks were

1356
01:13:40,549 --> 01:13:43,184
and if I get arrested,
I get arrested.

1357
01:13:43,219 --> 01:13:46,971
Uh... we were able
to get the information,

1358
01:13:47,022 --> 01:13:50,975
uh, that needed to get out, out.

1359
01:13:51,026 --> 01:13:53,928
And you and Glenn are
able to keep reporting,

1360
01:13:54,797 --> 01:13:57,188
uh, regardless
of what happens to me.

1361
01:13:58,435 --> 01:14:01,321
<i>Now what 29-year-old
Edward Snowden said...</i>

1362
01:14:04,039 --> 01:14:07,408
<i>...of phone records
and monitored Internet data.</i>

1363
01:14:07,459 --> 01:14:09,327
<i>The Guardian newspaper
revealed his identity...</i>

1364
01:14:09,378 --> 01:14:11,329
- Yes?
<i>- at his own request.</i>

1365
01:14:11,380 --> 01:14:12,997
<i>From Washington,
David Willis has this.</i>

1366
01:14:13,048 --> 01:14:15,667
Uh, I'm sorry. Who's asking?

1367
01:14:17,503 --> 01:14:19,971
Uh, I'm afraid you have the wrong room.
Thank you.

1368
01:14:21,497 --> 01:14:22,864
Wall Street Journal.

1369
01:14:34,148 --> 01:14:36,070
Yes?

1370
01:14:38,390 --> 01:14:40,074
Uh, I'm sorry. Say again?

1371
01:14:42,444 --> 01:14:44,412
Uh, no. No, thank you. No calls.

1372
01:14:44,446 --> 01:14:46,915
Uh, I think they have
the wrong number.

1373
01:14:47,584 --> 01:14:50,022
Yeah, no calls.
Thank you. Uh, wait.

1374
01:14:50,059 --> 01:14:54,062
I'm sorry. If it's, uh, if it's
two men from the front desk,

1375
01:14:54,151 --> 01:14:56,331
uh, they can call,
but no outside calls.

1376
01:14:56,393 --> 01:14:59,460
Wait, actually,
just let them through.

1377
01:15:00,362 --> 01:15:01,763
Wait, wait. Ma'am?

1378
01:15:01,883 --> 01:15:03,101
Fuck.

1379
01:15:07,812 --> 01:15:09,437
Yes?

1380
01:15:14,465 --> 01:15:17,600
Uh, wait. Is it, uh,
is it a lawyer?

1381
01:15:18,814 --> 01:15:21,449
Yeah, no, no, no, I mean
the people who are asking.

1382
01:15:21,483 --> 01:15:24,619
Ask them if they are lawyers.

1383
01:15:29,854 --> 01:15:32,794
Uh, no. Tell her that,
uh, she has the wrong number

1384
01:15:32,828 --> 01:15:35,263
and there's no Mr. Snowden here.

1385
01:16:19,984 --> 01:16:20,547
Yeah.

1386
01:16:23,263 --> 01:16:25,898
Hi, I'm the, uh, client.

1387
01:16:27,823 --> 01:16:30,409
Uh, pretty good. I... I'm doing well.

1388
01:16:45,734 --> 01:16:47,318
Okay.

1389
01:16:52,626 --> 01:16:54,210
Okay.

1390
01:17:01,633 --> 01:17:02,333
Yeah.

1391
01:17:04,286 --> 01:17:05,559
Okay, that... that's great.

1392
01:17:05,590 --> 01:17:07,255
Uh, is it okay if I
bring equipment?

1393
01:17:07,289 --> 01:17:10,531
'Cause I'm just kind of going, uh, so I
can leave in any direction at any time

1394
01:17:10,570 --> 01:17:12,999
and not come back if necessary.

1395
01:17:15,848 --> 01:17:16,632
Okay.

1396
01:17:23,322 --> 01:17:25,440
Okay, that sounds good.

1397
01:17:25,474 --> 01:17:27,775
Thank you, uh, thank you
so much for helping me.

1398
01:17:53,519 --> 01:17:55,436
Okay.

1399
01:18:09,054 --> 01:18:10,284
Yeah, so,

1400
01:18:10,319 --> 01:18:12,570
and so is there
a precedent for this,

1401
01:18:12,621 --> 01:18:16,657
where Hong Kong would extradite
someone for political speech?

1402
01:18:31,373 --> 01:18:33,307
Mm-hmm.

1403
01:19:24,076 --> 01:19:26,027
<i>The President certainly
does not welcome the way that</i>

1404
01:19:26,061 --> 01:19:28,529
<i>this debate has earned greater
attention in the last week.</i>

1405
01:19:28,564 --> 01:19:31,566
<i>The leak of classified information
about sensitive programs</i>

1406
01:19:31,600 --> 01:19:34,068
<i>that are important in our fight
against terrorists who would</i>

1407
01:19:34,102 --> 01:19:37,197
<i>do harm to Americans,
uh, is a problem,</i>

1408
01:19:37,243 --> 01:19:40,962
<i>but the debate itself is
legitimate and should be engaged.</i>

1409
01:23:32,347 --> 01:23:34,508
All right, so which ones
do we want here, then?

1410
01:23:34,526 --> 01:23:37,083
This is operational stuff, so
we mustn't say any of this.

1411
01:23:37,106 --> 01:23:38,556
So redact that.

1412
01:23:38,584 --> 01:23:40,118
Go to the top.

1413
01:23:40,348 --> 01:23:41,849
What about the Alexander quote?

1414
01:23:41,867 --> 01:23:43,517
Yeah, that's in TARMAC.

1415
01:23:43,739 --> 01:23:46,737
"Why can't we collect all
the signals all the time?

1416
01:23:46,788 --> 01:23:49,824
"Sounds like a good summer
homework project for Menwith."

1417
01:23:49,858 --> 01:23:53,160
Keith Alexander, the head of
the NSA, on a visit to U.K.

1418
01:23:53,194 --> 01:23:54,495
- This one.
- Yeah.

1419
01:23:54,529 --> 01:23:57,782
It's a Secret document,
isn't it? Secret document.

1420
01:23:58,097 --> 01:24:02,169
We've got a stick here which should
just have 3 single... slides on them.

1421
01:24:02,203 --> 01:24:06,424
If it's got more than 3 single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.

1422
01:24:08,802 --> 01:24:10,820
- Yeah?
- Yeah, that's it.

1423
01:24:10,971 --> 01:24:14,411
This is really dangerous stuff
for us at Guardian.

1424
01:24:14,450 --> 01:24:17,735
If you make mistakes at the very end, where
we kept it all under lock and key and...

1425
01:24:17,769 --> 01:24:20,776
And no one knows... you know,
I'm not saying that...

1426
01:24:20,854 --> 01:24:25,526
they will come in and smack the front door
down if we... if we elaborate on that.

1427
01:24:25,560 --> 01:24:29,196
And he said the Prime Minister's
extremely concerned about this.

1428
01:24:29,230 --> 01:24:32,533
And they kept saying,
"And this is from the very top."

1429
01:25:42,470 --> 01:25:46,073
<i>As you can see on this map, the flight
that reportedly has Snowden aboard</i>

1430
01:25:46,107 --> 01:25:49,059
<i>has almost reached its destination
here in Moscow, scheduled</i>

1431
01:25:49,127 --> 01:25:51,311
<i>to land in the Russian capital
within minutes.</i>

1432
01:25:51,329 --> 01:25:56,975
As you may have heard,
there is a CIA, uh, agent

1433
01:25:57,038 --> 01:25:59,653
who has revealed a lot
of information,

1434
01:25:59,671 --> 01:26:02,673
and he is now trapped
in the, um,

1435
01:26:02,707 --> 01:26:04,859
the airport in Moscow.

1436
01:26:04,893 --> 01:26:09,220
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
but when he landed in the Moscow airport,

1437
01:26:09,282 --> 01:26:13,350
the American government had
cancelled, uh, his passport.

1438
01:26:13,385 --> 01:26:16,520
So formally, he hasn't entered
into Russian territory.

1439
01:26:16,555 --> 01:26:19,781
He's in the transit area
of the airport,

1440
01:26:19,836 --> 01:26:22,562
and one of our people is
accompanying him.

1441
01:26:22,625 --> 01:26:26,313
We are trying to arrange
a private jet,

1442
01:26:26,347 --> 01:26:30,219
uh, to, um, take him

1443
01:26:30,235 --> 01:26:34,688
from, uh, Moscow to, uh, Ecuador

1444
01:26:34,706 --> 01:26:37,625
or perhaps maybe Venezuela

1445
01:26:37,659 --> 01:26:41,912
or maybe Iceland, um, countries
where he would be safe.

1446
01:30:11,635 --> 01:30:15,187
May I collect
all phones, please?

1447
01:30:17,809 --> 01:30:19,513
Okay.

1448
01:30:22,692 --> 01:30:25,185
I have everything here, so...

1449
01:30:26,521 --> 01:30:28,091
Put them in the refrigerator.

1450
01:30:31,943 --> 01:30:34,545
So...

1451
01:30:39,404 --> 01:30:42,602
So, as you know, in June,

1452
01:30:42,620 --> 01:30:47,574
Snowden was charged
with 3 legal violations,

1453
01:30:47,608 --> 01:30:54,787
felonies, principally under a World War I-era
criminal law called the Espionage Act.

1454
01:30:54,850 --> 01:30:58,585
Uh, the Espionage Act is
an extremely broad

1455
01:30:58,619 --> 01:31:01,752
criminal prohibition
against the sharing

1456
01:31:01,807 --> 01:31:05,666
or dissemination of what's called
national defence information.

1457
01:31:05,729 --> 01:31:09,346
It was only used
to, uh, prosecute people

1458
01:31:09,397 --> 01:31:12,261
who had been accused of
acting with a foreign power.

1459
01:31:12,300 --> 01:31:14,433
Uh, spies, not whistleblowers.

1460
01:31:14,511 --> 01:31:17,154
And it's a very unusual legal
representation, I think,

1461
01:31:17,188 --> 01:31:20,157
not just for all of you,
but for me as well.

1462
01:31:20,191 --> 01:31:23,160
Um, the Espionage Act
does not distinguish

1463
01:31:23,194 --> 01:31:26,646
between leaks to the press
in the public interest, um,

1464
01:31:26,664 --> 01:31:30,964
and selling secrets to foreign
enemies for personal profit.

1465
01:31:30,995 --> 01:31:34,004
So, under the Espionage Act,
it's not a defence

1466
01:31:34,038 --> 01:31:36,156
if the information
that was disclosed

1467
01:31:36,174 --> 01:31:40,634
should not have been withheld in the first
place, that it was improperly classified.

1468
01:31:40,713 --> 01:31:45,432
It's not a defence if the dissemination was in
the public interest, that it led to reforms.

1469
01:31:45,645 --> 01:31:47,968
Um, even if a court determines

1470
01:31:48,002 --> 01:31:51,438
that the programs that were revealed
were illegal or unconstitutional,

1471
01:31:51,503 --> 01:31:53,922
that's still not a defence
under the Espionage Act.

1472
01:31:53,942 --> 01:31:57,267
The government doesn't have
to defend the classification,

1473
01:31:57,322 --> 01:32:00,491
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release.

1474
01:32:00,540 --> 01:32:02,566
Um, all of this is irrelevant,

1475
01:32:02,617 --> 01:32:05,518
so when we say that
the trial wouldn't be fair,

1476
01:32:05,536 --> 01:32:10,561
we're not talking about what human rights
lawyers think of as fair trial practices.

1477
01:32:10,623 --> 01:32:12,943
We're saying the law...
the statute itself...

1478
01:32:12,975 --> 01:32:16,213
um, eliminates
any kind of defence

1479
01:32:16,247 --> 01:32:18,215
that Snowden might
be able to make,

1480
01:32:18,249 --> 01:32:21,051
and essentially would
equate him with a spy.

1481
01:32:21,085 --> 01:32:26,056
And of course, those 3 counts could
be increased to a 100 or 200 or 300.

1482
01:32:26,090 --> 01:32:28,146
They could charge him
separately for each document

1483
01:32:28,201 --> 01:32:31,311
that has been published
by a journalist.

1484
01:32:31,346 --> 01:32:33,430
And I think that...
that we all recognize,

1485
01:32:33,481 --> 01:32:36,650
even though we sit here as
lawyers in a lawyers' meeting,

1486
01:32:36,684 --> 01:32:40,320
that... that it's
probably 95% politics

1487
01:32:40,355 --> 01:32:44,441
and 5% law... how this
will be resolved.

1488
01:33:16,257 --> 01:33:19,226
Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes,

1489
01:33:19,260 --> 01:33:21,695
and he should be returned
to the United States,

1490
01:33:21,729 --> 01:33:25,198
where he will be granted
full due process and every right

1491
01:33:25,233 --> 01:33:27,734
available to him
as a United States citizen,

1492
01:33:27,768 --> 01:33:30,754
uh, facing our justice system
under the Constitution.

1493
01:34:22,198 --> 01:34:24,541
<i>No, I don't
think Mr. Snowden was a patriot.</i>

1494
01:34:24,592 --> 01:34:30,514
<i>I called for a thorough review
of our surveillance operations</i>

1495
01:34:30,548 --> 01:34:33,633
before Mr. Snowden made
these leaks.

1496
01:34:33,667 --> 01:34:37,325
My preference, and I think...

1497
01:34:37,372 --> 01:34:40,005
the American people's
preference, would have been

1498
01:34:40,020 --> 01:34:44,611
for a lawful, orderly
examination of these laws;

1499
01:34:44,957 --> 01:34:50,145
a, uh, thoughtful,
fact-based debate

1500
01:34:50,243 --> 01:34:54,714
uh, that would then lead us
to a better place.

1501
01:35:32,031 --> 01:35:34,032
Oh, my God.

1502
01:35:34,176 --> 01:35:35,765
David.

1503
01:35:36,835 --> 01:35:39,257
Hello, my baby, how you doing?

1504
01:35:39,468 --> 01:35:40,898
- I'm okay.
- You okay?

1505
01:35:40,920 --> 01:35:42,454
Mm-hmm. Let's go.

1506
01:35:46,216 --> 01:35:47,240
I just want to go home.

1507
01:35:47,258 --> 01:35:48,562
Okay, okay, okay.

1508
01:35:48,593 --> 01:35:50,260
You just have to walk in.

1509
01:35:57,563 --> 01:35:59,886
- How are you?
- Good, good. I'm totally fine.

1510
01:35:59,920 --> 01:36:02,222
- I didn't sleep at all. I couldn't sleep.
- I know.

1511
01:36:24,589 --> 01:36:26,922
Recent reports
have revealed that the NSA

1512
01:36:26,968 --> 01:36:30,799
have access to encryption keys,
and they paid tech companies

1513
01:36:30,814 --> 01:36:33,453
to introduce back doors
in encryption protocols.

1514
01:36:33,471 --> 01:36:36,456
So we're going to talk
about ways in which we can

1515
01:36:36,474 --> 01:36:40,503
defend ourselves against
governments spying on us.

1516
01:36:40,534 --> 01:36:45,632
So Mr. Jacob Appelbaum is an encryption and
security software developer and journalist.

1517
01:36:45,650 --> 01:36:50,820
Ladar Levinson is the founder of the
encrypted email service Lavabit,

1518
01:36:50,855 --> 01:36:53,306
used by Edward Snowden.
You have the floor.

1519
01:36:53,839 --> 01:36:54,730
Thank you.

1520
01:36:54,777 --> 01:36:59,663
Lavabit is an email service that
hopefully one day will be able to, um,

1521
01:36:59,697 --> 01:37:03,340
stand on its own without
any references to Snowden.

1522
01:37:03,403 --> 01:37:06,253
My service was designed
to remove me

1523
01:37:06,287 --> 01:37:09,756
from the possibility
of being forced

1524
01:37:09,790 --> 01:37:12,142
to violate a person's privacy.

1525
01:37:12,316 --> 01:37:16,996
Quite simply, Lavabit was designed to remove
the service provider from the equation.

1526
01:37:17,498 --> 01:37:19,771
By not having logs on my server

1527
01:37:19,845 --> 01:37:23,297
and not having access to
a person's emails on disk,

1528
01:37:23,506 --> 01:37:26,346
I wasn't eliminating the
possibility of surveillance,

1529
01:37:26,377 --> 01:37:30,330
I was simply removing
myself from that equation,

1530
01:37:30,544 --> 01:37:34,047
in that surveillance would have
to be conducted on the target...

1531
01:37:34,127 --> 01:37:37,546
either the sender or the
receiver of the messages.

1532
01:37:37,916 --> 01:37:41,494
But I was approached
by the FBI quite recently

1533
01:37:41,539 --> 01:37:45,455
and told that because I couldn't
turn over the information

1534
01:37:45,493 --> 01:37:47,591
from that one particular user,

1535
01:37:47,630 --> 01:37:50,964
I would be forced to give up those
SSL keys and let the FBI collect

1536
01:37:50,998 --> 01:37:55,085
every communication on my network
without any kind of transparency.

1537
01:37:56,159 --> 01:37:57,554
And, of course...

1538
01:37:57,971 --> 01:38:01,558
I wasn't... comfortable
with that, to say the least.

1539
01:38:01,592 --> 01:38:06,479
Um, more disturbing was the fact that I couldn't
even tell anybody that it was going on.

1540
01:38:06,920 --> 01:38:11,651
So I decided if I didn't win
the fight to unseal my case,

1541
01:38:11,686 --> 01:38:16,022
if I didn't win the battle to be able
to tell people what was going on,

1542
01:38:16,375 --> 01:38:19,928
then my only ethical choice
left was to shut down.

1543
01:38:22,326 --> 01:38:23,896
Think about that.

1544
01:38:25,101 --> 01:38:26,693
I believe in the rule of law.

1545
01:38:26,740 --> 01:38:29,953
I believe in the need to
conduct investigations,

1546
01:38:30,488 --> 01:38:34,255
but those investigations are supposed
to be difficult for a reason.

1547
01:38:34,296 --> 01:38:38,299
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy

1548
01:38:38,380 --> 01:38:41,014
because of how intrusive it is,

1549
01:38:41,048 --> 01:38:44,017
because of how disruptive it is.

1550
01:38:44,051 --> 01:38:46,519
If we can't... if we don't
have our right to privacy,

1551
01:38:46,554 --> 01:38:49,522
how do we have a free
and open discussion?

1552
01:38:49,791 --> 01:38:52,892
What good is the right
to free speech...

1553
01:38:54,736 --> 01:38:56,980
if it's not protected,

1554
01:38:57,031 --> 01:38:59,949
in the sense that you can't
have a private discussion

1555
01:38:59,984 --> 01:39:02,869
with somebody else about
something you disagree with.

1556
01:39:03,309 --> 01:39:05,859
Think about the chilling
effect that that has.

1557
01:39:05,893 --> 01:39:07,929
Think about the chilling
effect it does have

1558
01:39:07,957 --> 01:39:10,992
on countries that don't
have a right to privacy.

1559
01:39:11,230 --> 01:39:13,596
I've noticed a really interesting
discussion point, which is

1560
01:39:13,614 --> 01:39:18,618
that what people used to call liberty
and freedom, we now call privacy.

1561
01:39:18,636 --> 01:39:22,589
And we say, in the same breath,
that privacy is dead.

1562
01:39:22,982 --> 01:39:26,092
This is something that really
concerns me about my generation,

1563
01:39:26,143 --> 01:39:28,961
especially when we talk about how
we're not surprised by anything.

1564
01:39:28,979 --> 01:39:31,981
I think that we should consider
that when we lose privacy,

1565
01:39:32,016 --> 01:39:34,658
we lose agency,
we lose liberty itself,

1566
01:39:34,705 --> 01:39:37,470
because we no longer feel free
to express what we think.

1567
01:39:37,488 --> 01:39:39,972
There's this myth of the
passive surveillance machine.

1568
01:39:39,990 --> 01:39:42,609
But actually, what is
surveillance except control?

1569
01:39:42,924 --> 01:39:45,947
This notion that the NSA are passive?
This is nonsense.

1570
01:39:45,993 --> 01:39:47,977
What we see is that
they actively attack

1571
01:39:48,027 --> 01:39:50,511
European citizens,
American citizens, and,

1572
01:39:50,537 --> 01:39:53,823
in fact, anyone that they can
if they perceive an advantage.

1573
01:41:29,830 --> 01:41:31,301
Okay.

1574
01:41:32,056 --> 01:41:33,436
Right?

1575
01:41:37,117 --> 01:41:39,702
Um, I'll have to give
that in testimony.

1576
01:41:40,134 --> 01:41:41,899
What are you going to tell?

1577
01:41:41,926 --> 01:41:44,561
Uh, everything
I can, truthfully.

1578
01:41:45,641 --> 01:41:47,559
What... what will you
talk about?

1579
01:41:47,626 --> 01:41:50,578
Uh, whatever the
questions they ask me.

1580
01:41:50,605 --> 01:41:53,006
- Yeah, I think it's over there.
- Okay, all right.

1581
01:41:53,821 --> 01:41:54,875
Thank you.

1582
01:42:00,331 --> 01:42:03,249
- Hey. How are you?
- Good.

1583
01:42:03,283 --> 01:42:05,963
- How are you? Good to see you again.
- Nice to meet you again, yes.

1584
01:43:37,576 --> 01:43:40,485
What do you think they're doing
to reporters, those of us

1585
01:43:40,509 --> 01:43:43,933
that are working directly with,
uh, the Snowden documents?

1586
01:43:43,984 --> 01:43:46,319
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?

1587
01:43:46,353 --> 01:43:50,075
Uh, you're... you're on
the cast-iron cover list,

1588
01:43:50,114 --> 01:43:53,559
which means any... any
electronic, uh, device you use

1589
01:43:53,577 --> 01:43:57,413
that they can attach to you, they'll
record and capture all that data.

1590
01:43:57,682 --> 01:43:58,877
And what do they do
with that data?

1591
01:43:58,916 --> 01:44:00,566
They're just trying to
figure out what we're doing?

1592
01:44:00,584 --> 01:44:03,091
Uh, well, they're trying...
that's part of it,

1593
01:44:03,123 --> 01:44:05,787
but the other part... primarily,
the part for them, I think, is

1594
01:44:05,841 --> 01:44:07,911
to find the sources of
information you're getting.

1595
01:44:07,981 --> 01:44:12,178
So if I have a confidential source who's
giving me information as a whistleblower,

1596
01:44:12,212 --> 01:44:14,972
and he works within the U.S.
government, and he's concerned

1597
01:44:15,035 --> 01:44:18,217
about what he perceives as
violations of the Constitution,

1598
01:44:18,548 --> 01:44:21,344
um, and he gets
in touch with me, they...

1599
01:44:21,379 --> 01:44:22,602
- Yep.
- Go ahead, yeah.

1600
01:44:22,649 --> 01:44:24,691
Yeah, from there on,
they would nail him

1601
01:44:24,725 --> 01:44:27,320
and start watching everything
he did, and if he started

1602
01:44:27,367 --> 01:44:29,737
passing data, I'm sure they'd
take him off the street.

1603
01:44:30,520 --> 01:44:35,702
I mean, the way you'd have to do it is like
Deep Throat did, right, in the Nixon years...

1604
01:44:35,876 --> 01:44:40,079
meet in the basement of a
parking garage, physically.

1605
01:45:20,101 --> 01:45:22,991
<i>"Let's disassociate our
metadata one last time</i>

1606
01:45:23,022 --> 01:45:27,620
<i>"so we don't have a clear record of your
true name in our final communication chain.</i>

1607
01:45:27,654 --> 01:45:30,603
<i>"This is obviously not to say you
can't claim your involvement,</i>

1608
01:45:30,666 --> 01:45:34,460
<i>"but as every trick in the book is
likely to be used in looking into this,</i>

1609
01:45:34,494 --> 01:45:39,498
<i>"I believe it's better that that particular
disclosure come on your own terms.</i>

1610
01:45:40,039 --> 01:45:42,180
<i>"Thank you again
for all you've done.</i>

1611
01:45:42,211 --> 01:45:44,470
<i>"So sorry again for
the multiple delays,</i>

1612
01:45:44,504 --> 01:45:48,975
<i>"but we've been in uncharted territory,
with no model to benefit from.</i>

1613
01:45:49,422 --> 01:45:53,516
<i>"If all ends well, perhaps the
demonstration that our methods worked</i>

1614
01:45:53,548 --> 01:45:56,199
<i>"will embolden more
to come forward.</i>

1615
01:45:56,368 --> 01:45:58,317
<i>"Citizen"</i>

1616
01:46:02,605 --> 01:46:08,578
So the update that I want to
give you is about the new, um...

1617
01:46:08,629 --> 01:46:11,581
the new source
that... that we...

1618
01:46:11,913 --> 01:46:14,608
- Okay.
- Um, that,

1619
01:46:14,635 --> 01:46:19,055
um, this is what...
this is the per...

1620
01:46:19,089 --> 01:46:21,557
you know, this is the person
who's doing the most...

1621
01:46:21,592 --> 01:46:24,093
- Mm-hmm, right, right.
- ...the work on it.

1622
01:46:24,144 --> 01:46:26,596
Um...

1623
01:46:26,811 --> 01:46:30,881
and now... and now, like,
basically what's happened is...

1624
01:46:33,187 --> 01:46:35,827
- And...
- That's actually...

1625
01:46:35,906 --> 01:46:40,561
that's really dangerous, um...
on the source's side.

1626
01:46:40,623 --> 01:46:42,161
Do they know how to take
care of themselves?

1627
01:46:42,196 --> 01:46:44,330
Well, you know, I mean he...
I mean, it's, um...

1628
01:46:44,364 --> 01:46:47,867
It's... it's all being done...

1629
01:46:48,807 --> 01:46:50,184
through this.

1630
01:46:50,231 --> 01:46:51,003
Okay.

1631
01:46:51,038 --> 01:46:54,006
And they're all talking...

1632
01:46:54,041 --> 01:46:55,775
- this way.
- Okay.

1633
01:46:55,845 --> 01:46:57,210
- And...
- I was gonna say,

1634
01:46:57,244 --> 01:46:59,095
one of the big
questions there is,

1635
01:46:59,129 --> 01:47:01,097
can they handle it, you
know, do they have the...

1636
01:47:01,131 --> 01:47:04,100
No, they're very careful,
um, even there, through that.

1637
01:47:04,134 --> 01:47:06,302
- Okay, okay.
- Yeah.

1638
01:47:10,514 --> 01:47:12,358
And...

1639
01:47:18,765 --> 01:47:20,867
That's where that is.

1640
01:47:22,566 --> 01:47:24,868
Wow, that's really something.

1641
01:47:36,803 --> 01:47:38,668
Did you know that?

1642
01:47:44,591 --> 01:47:48,010
- It's not the actual planes.
- Right, right, right.

1643
01:47:48,061 --> 01:47:49,395
You mean the control.

1644
01:47:49,429 --> 01:47:50,694
It's the process...

1645
01:47:50,718 --> 01:47:52,298
- Ah.
- ...who's sending the... yeah.

1646
01:47:52,855 --> 01:47:54,910
There's a... there's
a chart, you know?

1647
01:47:54,965 --> 01:47:57,469
There's, like, a whole layout and it...
for every one...

1648
01:47:57,487 --> 01:47:59,939
That is really bold,
it's really risky,

1649
01:47:59,973 --> 01:48:01,933
- but, you know, that's the thing.
- There's more.

1650
01:48:01,942 --> 01:48:03,059
If they understand
what they're doing...

1651
01:48:03,106 --> 01:48:05,210
I mean, there's this chart.
It goes like this.

1652
01:48:05,273 --> 01:48:07,029
It shows the
decision-making chart.

1653
01:48:07,080 --> 01:48:10,750
It's a chart that goes... it's...
it's shaped like this.

1654
01:48:16,276 --> 01:48:18,591
- So up here, it says...
- Mm-hmm.

1655
01:48:18,625 --> 01:48:21,460
That's the decision-making
chart for each...

1656
01:48:21,658 --> 01:48:23,165
one.

1657
01:48:27,272 --> 01:48:30,911
- It's so political!
- This is... this part's amazing.

1658
01:48:37,605 --> 01:48:38,144
That's...

1659
01:48:38,178 --> 01:48:40,146
That's fucking ridiculous.

1660
01:48:40,180 --> 01:48:42,815
It's... this is...
it's so shocking.

1661
01:48:47,688 --> 01:48:49,555
That's...

1662
01:48:49,586 --> 01:48:51,632
- No, I know.
- That's the population of an entire country.

1663
01:48:51,671 --> 01:48:53,288
I know.

1664
01:48:55,632 --> 01:48:58,331
That's what we're working on.

1665
01:49:12,121 --> 01:49:15,090
That person is incredibly
bold, but, um...

1666
01:49:15,832 --> 01:49:17,350
But also very well aware.

1667
01:49:17,384 --> 01:49:20,219
Right. I... you know,
I just hope... I mean...

1668
01:49:20,237 --> 01:49:22,554
No, I mean, the boldness
of it is shocking, but,

1669
01:49:22,572 --> 01:49:25,391
I mean, it was obviously
motivated by what you did.

1670
01:49:25,409 --> 01:49:27,567
- I mean, it...
- This is going to...

1671
01:49:27,614 --> 01:49:31,864
this is going to... that
could raise the profile

1672
01:49:32,593 --> 01:49:35,413
of this whole political
situation with whistleblowing

1673
01:49:35,444 --> 01:49:36,684
to a whole new level because...

1674
01:49:36,703 --> 01:49:38,788
- Exactly.
- It's gonna...

1675
01:49:38,839 --> 01:49:41,510
Yeah. I mean, I actually
think that's a great thing.

1676
01:49:41,591 --> 01:49:44,760
And I think people are gonna
see what's being hidden again,

1677
01:49:44,809 --> 01:49:49,980
again, by a totally different
part of the government.